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ABSTRACT 
Erin Frey: Antimicrobial Resistance and Zoonotic Outbreaks of Salmonella enterica in 
the United States, 2015-2018 
(Under the direction of Anna P. Schenck) 
 
The emergence of antimicrobial resistance worldwide has threatened the 
therapeutic viability of antimicrobial drugs. Non-typhoidal Salmonella enterica 
subspecies enterica sickens 1.2 million Americans annually and can be transmitted to 
people through food, water, animal contact, and animal environments. This paper 
represents the first description of the epidemiology of multistate zoonotic outbreaks of 
non-typhoidal Salmonella in the US and their representative patterns of antimicrobial 
susceptibility and resistance of patient isolates. It evaluates the rate of concordance 
between traditional phenotypic and newer genotypic predicted antimicrobial resistance 
patterns to in the context of Salmonella surveillance and treatment in the US that rely on 
the cooperation between local, state and federal public health organizations. Given the 
complex public health challenges public health leaders are urged to take the role of 
chief health strategists by using transformational leadership and systems thinking to 
engage stakeholders in the One-Health effort to combat zoonotic salmonellosis and 
antimicrobial resistance. 
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CHAPTER 1: MASTER’S PAPER FORMAT 
The focus of this paper is to describe the epidemiology of zoonotic outbreaks of 
non-typhoidal Salmonella enterica in the United States between 2015 and 2018. This 
analysis includes the descriptive epidemiology of those identified in outbreaks and the 
characterization of the resistance pattern of the bacterial isolates including comparing 
phenotypic resistance patterns from antimicrobial susceptibility testing and predicted 
resistance from whole genome sequencing. The paper is organized into the following 
three chapters. 
Zoonotic Outbreaks of Salmonella Enterica and Surveillance Systems in the 
United States: Background  
Chapter 2 is an introduction to the importance of antimicrobial drugs in treating 
human and animal illness, the burden of zoonotic salmonellosis in the United States, the 
context of state and federal surveillance programs for non-typhoidal Salmonella, and 
mechanisms for and patterns of antimicrobial resistance in a local and global context. 
Antimicrobial Resistance and Zoonotic Outbreaks of Salmonella Enterica in the 
United States, 2015 – 2018 
Chapter 3 is the output of my master’s practicum with colleagues at the Centers 
for Disease Control and Prevention in the National Center for Emerging and Zoonotic 
Infectious Diseases (NCEZID) in the Division of Foodborne, Waterborne and 
Environmental Diseases (DFWED) in the Enteric Disease Epidemiology Branch (EDEB) 
and Outbreak Response and Prevention Branch (ORPB). This section will be reviewed 
and cleared by staff at CDC for submission to a relevant microbiology journal in order to 
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inform current surveillance protocols during multi-state outbreaks of zoonotic disease 
including protocols for sample submission and testing for antimicrobial resistance. 
A Public Health Practitioner’s Role as Chief Health Strategist to Combat 
Antimicrobial Resistance and Zoonotic Outbreaks of Salmonella Enterica in the 
United States 
Finally, Chapter 4 describes opportunities to apply public health leadership 
concepts to the topic of enteric zoonotic disease and antimicrobial resistance including 
using a systems thinking approach to combatting zoonotic outbreaks of non-typhoidal 
Salmonella enterica and promoting antimicrobial stewardship in the United States. It 
explores ways to identify stakeholders at multiple levels of society and to describe their 
role level of interest and influence in the problem as well as their relative support and 
contribution to success public health interventions. The role of the public health 
professional as the chief health strategist to promote antimicrobial stewardship and 
outbreak prevention and value of transformational leadership and leadership at all levels 
is explored to achieve these goals. These concepts are related to my personal journey 
as a veterinarian and public health professional and to my career goals and objectives. 
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CHAPTER 2: ZOONOTIC OUTBREAKS OF SALMONELLA ENTERICA AND 
SURVEILLANCE SYSTEMS IN THE UNITED STATES 
Introduction 
The discovery of antibiotics has been lauded as one the ten greatest public 
health achievements of the 20th century (CDC, 1999). With their discovery previously 
fatal infections from bacteria such as Staphylococcus spp. and Streptococcus spp. were 
no longer incurable. Unfortunately, these once seemingly miraculous drugs are in 
danger of becoming obsolete since the prevalence of antimicrobial resistance is 
increasing locally and globally. The use of antimicrobial drugs causes selection 
pressure on bacterial populations, whether pathogenic or commensal microbiota, that 
can lead to the development or uncovering of resistant subpopulations of bacteria. In 
the instance when a bacterial strain or subpopulation stops being susceptible to an 
antimicrobial drug, it is considered to have acquired resistance (UMN, AMRLS, 2018). 
This is distinct from the innate or inherent resistance that bacterial species may have to 
certain antimicrobial drugs or drug classes, referred to as intrinsic resistance. While 
clinicians are accustomed to taking into account intrinsic resistance when choosing 
antimicrobial drugs for their patients’ infection, the possibility of acquired antimicrobial 
resistance makes treatment failure more likely and increases the need for antimicrobial 
susceptibility testing as a part of diagnostic and treatment plans.  
 Antimicrobial use, even when judicious or appropriate, is a driver of the 
increasing prevalence of antimicrobial resistant strains of bacteria, and even as more 
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antimicrobial drugs have been discovered, resistance to those antimicrobials has 
developed (CDC, 2013, AR Threats; CDC, 2018, What is Resistance?) The World 
Health Organization (WHO) has called antimicrobial resistance, “one of the biggest 
threats to global health, food security, and development today,” and cautions that 
resistant bacterial strains can lead to “longer hospital stays, higher medical costs and 
increased mortality” (WHO, Antibiotic Resistance, 2018). The current number of 
antimicrobial drugs under development has slowed, and according to the WHO “none of 
them are expected to be effective against the most dangerous forms of antibiotic-
resistant bacteria” (WHO, Antibiotic Resistance, 2018). This has threatened to stall 
progress on the control of infectious diseases such as tuberculosis and raises concerns 
that routine surgery and cancer chemotherapy may no longer be successful (WHO, 
Antimicrobial Resistance, 2018). 
2.1 Salmonella enterica subspecies enterica 
Salmonella enterica subspecies enterica is a gram-negative, rod-shaped bacillus 
that is further subdivided into serotypes that cause typhoid fever and those that do not, 
called non-typhoidal Salmonella. The focus of this paper is on the latter, non-typhoidal 
Salmonella, which is transmitted by the fecal-oral route and typically causes acute 
diarrhea with or without blood, abdominal cramps, fever, and possibly nausea, vomiting, 
or headache. More serious outcomes of Salmonella infection include bacteremia, 
meningitis, osteomyelitis, septic arthritis, and death (CDC, Information for Healthcare 
Providers, 2018). Every year in the US there are an estimated 1.2 million illnesses, 
23,000 hospitalizations, and 450 deaths caused by non-typhoidal Salmonella. 1.1 
million of the estimated 1.2 million illnesses are acquired in the US, and of these, 1 
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million (or an estimated 15.2 illnesses per 100,000 people) result from exposure to a 
contaminated food source (CDC, Information for Healthcare Providers, 2018; CDC, 
Q&A, 2018; Scallan et al., 2011). The remaining vehicles for transmission include 
contact with contaminated pet food, infected animals or animal surroundings including 
enclosures (e.g., cage, tank, pen) or environments (e.g., barn or kennel surfaces, 
railings, straw) (CDC, Information for Healthcare Providers, 2018).  
2.2 Salmonella Reporting – Public Health Surveillance 
National surveillance for Salmonella relies on several passive and active forms of 
reporting. Although salmonellosis has been part of the National Notifiable Disease 
Reporting System (NNDSS) since 1944, in 2018, the case definition for reporting 
Salmonella was split into two categories to differentiate Salmonellosis (excluding 
paratyphoid fever and typhoid fever) and Paratyphoid fever (caused by Salmonella 
serotypes Paratyphi A, Paratyphi B [tartrate negative] and Paratyphi C) (CDC, n.d., 
Salmonella Case Definition 2017; CDC, Salmonella, Summary NNDSS, n.d.). Clinicians 
voluntarily report cases as part of the NNDSS system and send isolates to public health 
laboratories that confirm, serotype and forward on unusual or untypable isolates to the 
CDC for further testing as part of the Laboratory-based Enteric Disease Surveillance 
System (LEDS) (CDC, Salmonella | Surveillance, 2018). To enhance epidemiological 
reporting from laboratory-confirmed cases of salmonellosis, the Foodborne Diseases 
Active Surveillance Network (FoodNet) conducts active surveillance using 10 sites 
nationally that cover an estimated 15% of the US population (CDC, FoodNet, 2016). 
The National Outbreak Reporting System (NORS) assists local, state and territorial 
health departments to report “enteric disease outbreaks caused by bacterial, viral, 
 6 
parasitic, chemical, toxin, and unknown agents, as well as foodborne and waterborne 
outbreaks of non-enteric disease” that include non-typhoidal Salmonella regardless of 
whether it is spread through water, food, people, animals, or environmental 
contamination (CDC, National Outbreak Reporting System (NORS), 2018). Even with 
these surveillance system underdiagnosis does occur, and in the case of foodborne 
outbreaks of non-typhoidal Salmonella, the true number of cases is estimated at 29.3 
times the number diagnosed (Scallan et al., 2011). 
2.3 Salmonella Outbreak Detection 
The timeline from when a person is infected with Salmonella bacteria to when the 
person is determined to be part of an outbreak can take from two to four weeks. For a 
patient to be included in an outbreak case count requires action and resources (e.g., 
money, time and personnel) from patients, health care providers and public health 
laboratories. This process starts when a person develops symptoms of illness and 
proceeds to an exam by a health care professional, who submits a patient sample to the 
lab for bacterial testing. If the laboratory determines that the bacterial sample contains 
Salmonella, state regulations require that it be sent to a public health laboratory, such 
as any one of the 83 PulseNet laboratories across the country, where they undergo 
pulsed-field gel electrophoresis (PFGE) and whole genome sequencing (WGS) to 
determine their genetic fingerprint for serotyping and DNA fingerprinting (CDC, Timeline 
for Reporting, 2015). These patterns are then uploaded to PulseNet, which is the 
molecular subtyping network for foodborne disease surveillance, and if two or more 
patterns match, CDC scientists evaluate the cluster to determine whether it constitutes 
an outbreak of disease (CDC, PulseNet, 2016). Since 2014 the CDC has supplemented 
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PFGE pattern testing in cluster investigations with WGS because it quantifies isolate 
relatedness more precisely using allele or single nucleotide polymorphism differences 
between isolates rather than the less discriminatory PFGE “fingerprint” band pattern. 
If a patient meets the established outbreak case definition including clinical (e.g., 
diarrhea, abdominal pain, nausea and sometimes vomiting), laboratory (e.g., a culture 
independent test supports and culture confirms the presence of Salmonella), and 
epidemiologic criteria (e.g., person, place, time), they are added to the outbreak count 
(CDC, Surveillance Case Definition | Salmonella, 2017). Throughout this process health 
departments conduct hypothesis generating and hypothesis testing questionnaires, 
traceback and food and environmental testing to determine the source of the outbreak 
(CDC, Outbreak Infographic, n.d.). In the case of salmonellosis linked to animal 
outbreaks this might include testing animals (e.g., fecal or cecal samples) or their 
environment (e.g., turtle water, animal pens or bedding).  
2.4 Enteric Zoonoses Activity in the Outbreak Response and Prevention Branch 
Division of Foodborne, Waterborne and Environmental Diseases 
Within the CDC’s Outbreak Response and Prevention Branch (ORPB) of the 
Division of Foodborne, Waterborne and Environmental Diseases (DFWED), the Enteric 
Zoonoses Activity (EZA) team is responsible for conducting multistate enteric zoonoses 
outbreak investigations (CDC, Enteric Zoonoses Activity, 2018). When hypothesis-
generating interviews from patients identified as part of an outbreak indicate a pattern of 
animal exposure that is greater than expected, outbreak response teams work to secure 
samples from animals and animal environments that people had contact with before 
becoming ill to enable comparisons with PFGE and/or WGS patterns from the ill people. 
Outbreaks linked to animals have resulted from contact with live poultry, reptiles (e.g., 
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geckos, lizards, and snakes), dairy calves, and most recently guinea pigs (CDC, 
Salmonella | Healthy Pets/Healthy People, 2018).  
For example, between 1990 and 2015, there were 57 outbreaks linked to 
Salmonella from baby poultry that included 2,885 illnesses, 450 hospitalizations, and 
five deaths (CDC, Don’t Play Chicken with Your Health, n.d.). Children aged < five years 
typically get sick at higher rates than other groups, and young children, the elderly, and 
those with weakened immune systems, such as people undergoing chemotherapy, 
typically have higher rates of serious outcomes such as hospitalization or death. While 
antibiotics are not generally needed or recommended for mild cases of salmonellosis, 
they are sometimes used in severe cases or in the aforementioned vulnerable groups 
and include first line (i.e., ciprofloxacin (adults), azithromycin (children, pregnant 
women), or ceftriaxone) and alternative options (e.g., ampicillin, trimethoprim-
sulfamethoxazole) (CDC, Information for Healthcare Providers, 2018; Shane et al. 
2017). 
2.5 Antimicrobial drug resistance threat from non-typhoidal Salmonella enterica 
The CDC, in its 2013 Antimicrobial Resistance Threats Report, gave non-
typhoidal Salmonella the middle threat level of Serious, defined as “significant antibiotic-
resistant threats. For varying reasons (e.g., low or declining domestic incidence or 
reasonable availability of therapeutic agents), they are not considered urgent, but these 
threats will worsen and may become urgent without ongoing public health monitoring 
and prevention activities.” (CDC, AR Threats, 2013)  
In light of growing numbers of antimicrobial resistant strains of bacteria globally, 
in 1996 the National Antimicrobial Resistance Monitoring System (NARMS) began 
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tracking “changes in the antimicrobial susceptibility of certain enteric (intestinal) bacteria 
found in ill people (CDC), retail meats (FDA), and food animals (USDA) in the United 
States” (CDC, 2018, NARMS). Additional goals of the NARMS surveillance program 
include communicating findings to stakeholders in the US and abroad for the purpose of 
instituting preventive strategies, engaging in research on the “emergence, persistence, 
and spread of antimicrobial resistance,” and sharing data with the FDA that can be used 
to inform decisions about antimicrobial drug approval for animal use (Karp, 2017). 
While NARMS focuses on resistance data, resistance information from NARMS 
is integrated with other national surveillance efforts. Isolates tested by NARMS may be 
linked using a common isolate identifier to records from PulseNet, NORS, and FoodNet 
(Karp, 2017). If an isolate is matched to an outbreak, the CDC links epidemiologic and 
laboratory data from PulseNet and NARMS to aid in outbreak investigation and 
response (Karp, 2017). Currently states are asked to submit a minimum of three 
representative isolates from each single-state outbreak to the CDC for NARMS testing 
(CDC, NARMS Human Isolates Surveillance Report for 2015; CDC, EDLB Submission 
Table, 2018). In addition to submitting every 20th sample of nontyphoidal Salmonella for 
surveillance, CDC requests that states submit additional isolates for multistate 
outbreaks; typically three to five isolates are requested per multistate outbreak, but 
additional isolates are requested when the epidemiology (e.g., subclusters of cases 
linked by common exposure) or molecular characteristics (e.g., PFGE patterns or WGS 
clades) indicate diversity within the outbreak (CDC, NARMS Human Isolates 
Surveillance Report for 2015). 
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2.6 Testing for antimicrobial drug resistance in non-typhoidal Salmonella 
enterica: Phenotypic and genotypic testing 
Salmonella isolates cultured from patient samples (typically stool, urine, or blood) 
were previously tested using antimicrobial susceptibility testing (AST) to determine 
whether the bacterial strain had phenotypic resistance to a defined set of antimicrobial 
drugs. Antimicrobial susceptibility testing methods and interpretive criteria used by the 
CDC were developed through work with the Clinical Laboratory Standards Institute 
(CLSI) and the European Committee on Antimicrobial Susceptibility Testing (EUCAST) 
(Karp, 2017). Of the 18 antibiotics from 12 drug classes that NARMS uses to test 
bacteria for resistance, the panel for testing Salmonella bacteria from 2015–2018 
included 15 antibiotics, of which 13 were used throughout the entire period, one 
(ceftiofur) was included until 2015, and one (meropenem) was included beginning in 
2016 (CDC, NARMS Report 2015, Table 2, 2018) (Table 1). 
One challenge of traditional AST testing is the time (e.g., days) it takes to 
physically ship bacteria from state health departments to CDC, to grow bacteria in 
culture and to perform identification and susceptibility testing. With the newer method of 
WGS bacteria can be screened rapidly for genetic determinants of resistance and 
compared to strains from different sources for genetic relatedness (Karp, 2017). In 
2015, the EZA was created at CDC and began requesting WGS of outbreak isolates in 
addition to the epidemiologic data from outbreak questionnaires and surveys. WGS can 
be used to detect resistance genes for antimicrobial drugs that are not part of the 
phenotypic resistance testing (i.e., AST panel) and can differentiate genetic 
mechanisms of resistance that lead to the same predicted resistance pattern (i.e., 
multiple genes or mutations can result in resistance to the same antimicrobial drug) 
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(McDermott, 2016). Having a whole genome sequence of an outbreak isolate 
strengthens the epidemiologic and laboratory evidence between outbreak cases and 
between samples from people, animals, foods, and the environment.  
These data are compiled into a WGS “tree” that depicts the genomic relatedness 
of samples in an outbreak, either through high-quality single nucleotide polymorphism 
(hqSNP) or whole genome multilocus sequence typing (wgMLST) trees that show the 
number of SNP or allele differences between isolates, respectively. Because the data 
from past outbreaks remains in the PulseNet database, WGS trees also include 
historical samples from past outbreaks (whether human, animal, food, or environmental) 
to put current outbreaks in context (Karp, 2017). 
One drawback of WGS is it relies on known resistance genes, which is why 
phenotypic testing of bacteria through AST will still be necessary to uncover new 
resistance patterns (Karp, 2017). Additionally, while AST demonstrates the expressed 
phenotypic resistance of an isolate (i.e., how it would respond to antimicrobials given to 
a patient), WGS detects the presence but not necessarily the expression of resistance 
genes (i.e., having genes that code for resistance does not guarantee that the bacteria 
will express those genes and induce resistance to that antimicrobial drug in the person 
or animal, from which it was isolated). Although WGS has been shown to predict 
antimicrobial resistance with a high degree of accuracy in non-typhoidal Salmonella, 
phenotypic resistance profiles derived from AST results are considered the gold 
standard when both types of testing are performed (McDermott et al., 2016). 
Although the CDC currently requests three to five isolates per outbreak, with the 
increase in WGS and culture-independent testing (CIDT), it is vital to understand how 
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many outbreak samples and what type of testing (i.e., AST vs. WGS) are needed to 
characterize the etiological agent and resistance patterns of an outbreak. Given limited 
personnel and monetary resources and the demands on time for the health care 
professionals, laboratorians, and health department employees, the protocol for sample 
submission will likely be a trade off between a desire for the greatest accuracy and 
precision while using resources efficiently. 
2.7 Significance of this paper 
The convention for outbreak reporting whether foodborne or zoonotic is to post a 
summary on the CDC website and share it with the media. On occasion outbreaks 
findings are presented as reports in the CDC’s Morbidity and Mortality Weekly (MMWR), 
or trends for one vehicle type are explored in more detail, such as live poultry-
associated outbreaks from 1990–2014 (Robertson et al., 2018; Basler et al., 2016). This 
paper represents the first time outbreak data from multiple years and from multiple 
zoonotic vehicles has been compiled and analyzed to evaluate the epidemiology and 
health outcomes of patients and to characterize antimicrobial resistance patterns by 
vehicle type. Knowing which groups are most affected will allow public health 
professionals to shape messaging and outreach to those groups. In addition, being able 
to characterize outbreaks by vehicle type and expected resistance will aid in drafting 
diagnosis and treatment guidelines for frontline health care professionals.  
It also is the first time that phenotypic and genotypic antimicrobial resistance 
patterns have been compared in a comprehensive manner across years and zoonotic 
vehicles to look for concordance between testing methodologies. By gaining an 
understanding which types of resistance discordance are common amongst zoonotic 
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outbreak, the NARMS team can update surveillance protocols and develop 
standardized guidance for testing and interpretation of results to aid health care 
professional in antimicrobial use decision-making. 
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CHAPTER 3: ANTIMICROBIAL RESISTANCE AND ZOONOTIC OUTBREAKS OF 
SALMONELLA ENTERICA IN THE UNITED STATES, 2015 – 2018 
3.1 Abstract 
The emergence of antimicrobial resistance worldwide has threatened the 
therapeutic viability of antimicrobial drugs. Non-typhoidal Salmonella enterica 
subspecies enterica sickens 1.2 million Americans annually and can be transmitted to 
people through food, water, animal contact and animal environments. This paper 
represents the first summary description of the epidemiology of multistate zoonotic 
outbreaks of non-typhoidal Salmonella in the US and their representative patterns of 
antimicrobial resistance in patient isolates. Thirty-two outbreaks (n=2691 patients) of 
zoonotic salmonellosis attributed to contact with live poultry, reptiles, dairy calves, and 
guinea pigs affected infants aged <1 month to adults aged >100 years and resulted in 
638 hospitalizations and 6 deaths between 2015 and 2018. Outbreaks linked to contact 
with live poultry represented the majority (>85%) of outbreaks and patients over the 
study period. Thirty-eight percent (n=1030/2691) of patient isolates underwent 
traditional antimicrobial susceptibility testing and/or whole genome sequencing for 
predicted resistance, and 40 distinct patterns of antimicrobial resistance emerged. Of 
the isolates tested (n=1030),19.2% (n=198) demonstrated resistance to at least one 
antimicrobial drug, and 13.8% (n=142) were resistant to 3 or more antimicrobial drugs. 
Resistance to streptomycin, sulfisoxazole, tetracycline, and ampicillin were the most 
prevalent. Traditional phenotypic and genotypic predicted patterns of resistance agreed 
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with or were explained by differences in phenotypic and genotypic testing protocols in 
over 90% of patient isolates. These results will be used to inform national Salmonella 
surveillance protocols and to coordinate local, state and federal outbreak response. 
3.2 Introduction 
In the United States the National Antimicrobial Resistance Monitoring System 
(NARMS) was established to integrate surveillance and tracking of antimicrobial 
resistance patterns in enteric pathogens from people, retail meats, and animals. It is a 
collaboration of the Centers for Disease Control and Prevention (CDC), Food and Drug 
Administration (FDA), and the United States Department of Agriculture (USDA) with 
cooperation and support from local, state, and territorial health departments who submit 
bacterial isolates. Health departments are asked to submit every 20th Salmonella isolate 
to CDC-NARMS for antimicrobial resistance testing as well as three to five 
representative isolates from each outbreak of the above pathogens. Samples submitted 
to NARMS by 54 state and large urban health departments undergo antimicrobial 
susceptibility testing (AST) by broth microdilution using a 14-drug Sensititre® panel 
(CDC, NARMS Report 2015, 2018). Previous internal assessments of NARMS data by 
CDC staff indicated that the current protocol of submitting three to five isolates per 
outbreak was generally sufficient to acquire an outbreak’s major resistance profile. 
The phenotypic resistance profile determined by AST is complemented by the 
predicted resistance from genetic profile of sequenced isolates submitted to PulseNet. 
Although PulseNet was originally envisioned and piloted in 1996 as a way to detect and 
respond to outbreaks of foodborne disease, bacterial isolates from ill persons have 
been linked to outbreaks caused by contact with animals or the environment (e.g., 
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lakes, pools) (CDC, FAQs PulseNet, 2016; CDC, Outbreak Detection, 2016). Through 
partnerships with state and large urban health departments PulseNet performs whole 
genome sequencing (WGS) on outbreak isolates, and sequence differences are 
compared using whole genome multilocus sequence type (wgMLST) or high-quality 
single nucleotide polymorphism (hqSNP) analysis and displayed visually on a tree that 
depicts isolate relatedness and clustering into distinct clades. Isolates submitted to 
PulseNet can be compared via wgMLST or hqSNP analysis to outbreak-associated 
isolates including those from human cases and implicated vehicles (e.g., food or animal 
origin). Outbreak isolates are typically selected for submission to NARMS before the 
outbreak investigation is complete for both single-state and multistate outbreaks. The 
selection of isolates for susceptibility testing is independent of the decision to create a 
WGS tree to aid the epidemiologic investigation. Therefore, isolates from a given 
outbreak may be selected for susceptibility testing without prior knowledge of their 
genetic relationship to other isolates in the outbreak. Susceptibility testing results from 
NARMS are linked to data in PulseNet at the level of the individual isolate once the 
results have laboratory approval. Susceptibility testing results are linked to 
epidemiologic data from each outbreak reported to NORS at the level of the outbreak 
after NARMS and NORS have completed data cleaning for the annual cycle (typically > 
1 year after the conclusion of the outbreak). 
Enteric pathogen isolates are evaluated for the presence of resistance 
determinants (i.e., genes and mutation) using a modified version of ResFinder software 
(BioNumerics), and these resistance determinants are used to predict the resistance of 
outbreak isolates to the same antimicrobial drugs that are on the phenotypic NARMS 
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AST panel. WGS has been shown to predict antimicrobial resistance with a high degree 
of accuracy in non-typhoidal Salmonella (McDermott et al., 2016). Although 
concordance between predicted and genotypic resistance patterns has been found 
human and retail meat isolates (McDermott et al, 2016), no such study has compared 
phenotypic resistance by AST with genotypic resistance from WGS for human isolates 
from zoonotic outbreaks of Salmonella. 
Since 2015 when the CDC began requesting WGS for isolates from zoonotic 
outbreak of enteric disease (specifically non-typhoidal Salmonella), the proportion of 
samples with sequencing data has increased. Using existing epidemiologic, AST and 
WGS data from zoonotic outbreaks of non-typhoidal Salmonella that have occurred 
since widespread use of WGS methodology (2015 through 2018), we performed 
descriptive epidemiology of enteric zoonotic disease outbreaks and described 
antimicrobial resistance in zoonotic outbreaks and the frequency of resistance 
discordance.  
3.3 Methods 
Data and specimen collection 
Epidemiologic data used in this analysis were collected during outbreak 
investigations to aid outbreak response. Records reside at both the CDC and state and 
large urban health departments since the latter usually interviews case-patients and 
submits certain elements of the resulting epidemiologic data to the CDC. To fulfill 
requirements of the National Notifiable Diseases Surveillance System (NNDSS), 
Salmonella isolates were submitted to state or large urban health departments, and a 
subset of these isolates (3–5 per outbreak) was submitted to the CDC for antimicrobial 
 18 
susceptibility testing (AST), whole genome sequencing (WGS), or both. All specimens 
were identified with a corresponding isolate ID, which is a coded variable that protects 
personal identifiers. The original health department, from which the sample originated, 
has access to the key to personal identifiers. 
Data and specimen disposition 
Isolates previously submitted to CDC-NARMS for AST and/or WGS testing were 
frozen and will be stored indefinitely at CDC according to standard NARMS protocol. 
Isolates previously submitted and sequenced at local and state health departments will 
be subject to individual site disposition protocol, which usually entails storage for 
months to years but not indefinitely. Whole genome sequencing data will be stored in 
the PulseNet database according to PulseNet protocol. Finally epidemiologic data will 
be stored indefinitely in the CDC’s outbreak database according to ORPB protocol. A 
coded isolate ID to protect personal identifiers will identify specimens, and data will be 
presented in aggregate to avoid discerning individual-level patient information  
Outbreak Identification 
Zoonotic outbreaks of enteric disease with a known or suspected vehicle from 
2015–2018 were identified from the CDC’s Enteric Zoonoses Activity (EZA) team, a 
subset of ORPB. Although other outbreaks of zoonotic disease covered by ORPB and 
NARMS (e.g., Campylobacter jejuni in puppies in 2017) were noted during the time 
period, only outbreaks of non-typhoidal Salmonella were included in this analysis 
because it was the primary zoonotic outbreak pathogen identified and because NARMS 
submission protocols were expected to yield adequate data for analysis of both 
descriptive epidemiology and resistance patterns.  
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Some outbreak investigations involved more than one Salmonella serotype but 
were investigated under a single outbreak code due to the cases’ shared exposure to a 
common transmission vehicle (i.e., animal type); however, distinct serotypes are neither 
closely genetically related nor expected to share a common resistance profile. Prior to 
2017, outbreaks of live poultry-associated salmonellosis were assigned a unique 
outbreak code based on the Salmonella serotype of the cluster; however, beginning in 
2017, all live poultry outbreaks from the calendar year were grouped under one 
outbreak code due to the common outbreak vehicle. Given that WGS trees were 
constructed from individual serotypes and even subsets of a serotype based on the 
predominant PFGE pattern(s), live poultry outbreaks for the entirety of the study period 
were treated as distinct outbreaks based on the serotype/PFGE pattern combination 
regardless of the outbreak code used to identify them. Despite having one outbreak 
code, an outbreak of turtle-associated salmonellosis from 2015 was also treated as two 
separate outbreaks because two serotypes were identified, of which only one serotype 
had WGS analysis.  
Laboratory Analysis 
Completed outbreak investigations from 2015–2018 with existing WGS trees 
were identified, and individual isolates were classified according to their position on the 
tree (e.g., main clade, clade B, clade C, outlier) when included. Isolates were screened 
for the presence of resistance determinants using ResFinder 3.0 and for the presence 
of plasmids using PlasmidFinder 3.0 (Center for Genomic Epidemiology, DTU). 
Resistance patterns were predicted for each isolate based on the presence of 
resistance determinants according to established protocols and criteria (McDermott et 
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al., 2016). When both AST and WGS were performed on the same isolate, the predicted 
resistance (Pred-R) pattern from WGS was compared to the phenotypic resistance 
pattern from AST to ensure that no information was lost with updated sampling 
protocols. When phenotypic and genotypic resistance patterns were discordant for an 
antimicrobial drug on the standard NARMS panel, phenotypic AST results were given 
precedence over Pred-R from WGS. 
Epidemiologic Analysis 
Outbreak records from the ORPB database were obtained for each outbreak 
identified as above. Since reporting and grouping of data were not standardized during 
this period, and since outbreak questionnaires varied based on the suspected or 
confirmed vehicle, a core set of epidemiologic variables common to all outbreaks was 
determined. These include age (minimum, maximum, and median), gender 
(male/female), race (white/black/other), ethnicity (Hispanic/Latino: yes/no), 
hospitalization (yes/no), died (yes/no), and exposure to the implicated outbreak vehicle 
(yes/no). Data were considered missing if the record was blank or had the answers of 
‘don’t know,’ ‘unknown,’ or ‘no answer.’ Where possible, missing data from compiled 
multiple line listings for outbreak epidemiology was supplemented from demographic 
information derived from matched PulseNet records, which were only available for a 
subset of patients whose isolates were submitted for AST or WGS analysis. 
Epidemiology of the complete set of outbreaks was compared to a subset of outbreaks 
with at least 25% of outbreak isolates having WGS and a further subset that had WGS 
for 10 or more isolates totaling at least 25% of outbreak isolates. These cut-offs were 
chosen to reduce the likelihood of Type II error and increase the likelihood that the 
 21 
subset of case isolates within an outbreak with WGS and Pred-R data would be 
representative of the whole outbreak case set. 
Descriptive epidemiologic methods were used to characterize overall resistance 
profiles of each outbreak including resistance patterns, resistance to individual 
antimicrobial drugs or drug classes, and frequency of resistance by outbreak vehicle 
type, and resistance discordance was examined at the isolate level. For each outbreak, 
epidemiologic variables (as noted above) were compared between the full set of 
outbreak isolates and the subset of isolates, which had been analyzed for resistance 
using phenotypic (AST) and/or genotypic (WGS) predicted resistance testing.  
Outbreak isolates were analyzed for resistance to the 13 antimicrobials in nine 
CLSI drug classes that were part of the standard NARMS AST panel throughout the 
entire study period (2015–2018). These include aminoglycosides (gentamicin, 
streptomycin), beta-lactams/beta-lactamase inhibitor combinations (amoxicillin-
clavulanic acid), cephems (ceftriaxone, cefoxitin), folate pathway inhibitors 
(sulfisoxazole, trimethoprim-sulfamethoxazole), penicillin (ampicillin), phenicols 
(chloramphenicol), quinolones (ciprofloxacin, nalidixic acid), and tetracyclines 
(tetracycline) (Table 1). Ceftiofur and meropenem were excluded because they were not 
included over the complete study period. Ceftiofur was included in the NARMS AST 
panel until 2015, and meropenem was added to the AST panel in 2016. An additional 
aminoglycoside antibiotic, kanamycin, was included in the analysis because genetic 
patterns of predicted resistance are included in Pred-R testing. 
Outbreak resistance patterns were further compared based on the implicated 
animal vehicle (i.e., live poultry, reptile, dairy calves, guinea pigs). Because of the small 
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size of outbreaks linked to reptiles (11–102 cases) and the small number of isolates 
sequenced in each outbreak (0–49), for the purpose of comparison by resistance 
patterns, all reptile-associated outbreaks (i.e., gecko, turtle, snake) were compiled into 
one category. This is in keeping with how public health interventions are described by 
the CDC and other regarding reptiles and amphibians. Although dairy calves and guinea 
pigs are both mammals, their husbandry (on farm vs. in homes or schools) is different  
enough to warrant that these outbreaks be kept as distinct categories. Epidemiologic 
variables were compared between cases with resistant and susceptible isolates. The 
analysis was also stratified by the implicated vehicle or source type. Finally, 
antimicrobial resistance patterns for isolates within each outbreak were examined in 
regards to their position on the associated WGS tree (i.e., wgMLST or hqSNP) where 
available. 
3.4 Results 
Outbreak Epidemiology 
From 2015 to 2018 there were 33 multistate zoonotic outbreaks of enteric non-
typhoidal Salmonella investigated by the CDC Enteric Zoonoses Activity. One outbreak 
traced to turtles in 2016 was excluded from further analysis because it contained four 
distinct serotypes/PFGE patterns, a small number of isolates (n=6), of which only one 
sample had whole genome sequencing performed. From the remaining 32 outbreaks, 
23 outbreaks or 85.0% (2287/2691) of cases were linked to live poultry, seven 
outbreaks or 12.6% (338/2691) of cases to reptiles (i.e., geckos, turtles, and snakes), 
one outbreak or 2.1% (26/2691) of cases to dairy calves, and one outbreak or 0.4% 
(10/2691) to guinea pigs. Of the 2691 outbreak cases, 37.4% (n=1008) of isolates had 
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whole genome sequencing results, and 38.3% (n=1030) had either AST or WGS 
performed to look for antimicrobial resistance. 
Salmonella testing was performed on blood, urine and stool samples. From 
64.5% to 100% of bacterial isolates were obtained through human stool samples 
compared to blood (0–22.4%), urine (0–16.7%), and other (0–9.1%). Other sample 
sources included rectal swab (n=7), wound (n=7), other (n=5), isolated organisms (n=3), 
and 1 each of abscess, bone, gallbladder, peritoneal fluid, rectum, sputum, swab and 
tissue. 
Age data were available for between 91.7% and 100% of patients within each 
outbreak. 46.9% of outbreaks had age data for all patients, and all outbreaks had age 
data for more than 66% of their respective patients. Patients ranged from infants aged 
<1 month to a maximum of 106 years. At the outbreak level, patient age ranged from 
infants aged <1 month to one year, maximum age from 53 to 106 years, and median 
patient age as low as one year and as high as 56 years. 
Data on patient gender (male/female) were available for 90.0%–100% of patients 
within each outbreak. Complete gender data was available in 28.1% of outbreaks, and 
all outbreaks had data for more than 66% of their respective cases. From 41.5% to 
81.8% of outbreak patients were female with women representing the majority in 65.6% 
(21/32) of outbreaks. 
Race and ethnicity data were only available from 34% (11/32) of outbreaks, in 
which race was recorded for 5.6%–70.0% of patients, and ethnicity was recorded for 
7.1–70.0% of patients. No outbreaks had complete race or ethnicity data. For outbreaks 
in which racial data were available, 45% (5/11) of outbreaks had racial data in less than 
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33% of cases, and 18% (2/11) of outbreaks had racial data in more than 66% of cases. 
For outbreaks where race was reported, 37.5 to 100.0% of cases were white and 0–
50.0% of cases were Black/African American. The remaining cases were from other 
racial groups including American Indian/Alaska Native (n=2), Asian (n=4), Hispanic 
(n=1), Latino (n=1), other (n=6), and Yemeni (n=1) (total = 15/177 available). Of 
outbreaks where ethnicity data were available, 36% (4/11) of outbreaks had ethnicity 
data in less than 33% of cases, and 9% (1/11) of outbreaks had ethnicity data in more 
than 66% of cases. For outbreaks from which ethnicity was available (11/32 outbreaks; 
221 cases) from 0–68.8% of cases were of Hispanic/Latino descent. 
Hospitalization and death data were available for 31 of 32 of outbreaks and from 
56.5–100% of cases depending on the outbreak. Complete data on hospitalization and 
death were available from one outbreak each (3.1% of outbreaks). Reported health 
outcomes (hospitalization and death) were available for greater than 66% of case 
isolates in 90.6% of outbreaks. A total of 638 people were hospitalized, and the 
proportion of hospitalization at the outbreak level varied from 12.5%–55.6%. Zero 
deaths were reported in 81.3% (26/31) of outbreaks, one death was reported in 12.9% 
(4/31) of outbreaks, and two deaths were reported in the remaining outbreak for a total 
of 6 deaths reported overall. In the outbreak with two deaths, this resulted in an over 
case fatality rate of 9.1%. 
Data on case contact with the implicated animal were available for 31 of 32 
outbreaks. Complete exposure data was available in only one outbreak, but 81.3% of 
outbreaks had exposure data in at least 66% of case isolates. In one outbreak 9.5% of 
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cases had known contact with the vehicle, and in the remaining 30 outbreaks, 33.3% to 
100% of cases reported contact with the vehicle before becoming ill. 
Comparison to subsets based on proportion of outbreak isolates with WGS 
Eighteen outbreaks had WGS results for at least 25% of samples, of which 10 
outbreaks or 78.8% (1121/1423) were linked to live poultry, six outbreaks or 16.6% 
(236/1423) to reptiles, one outbreak or 3.9% (56/1423) to dairy calves and one outbreak 
or 0.7% (10/1423) to guinea pigs (Table 2). 62.4% (888/1423) of isolates had AST 
and/or WGS results. Of the 16 outbreaks that had WGS for at least 25% of samples and 
had 10 or more isolates sequenced, nine outbreaks or 79.9% (1110/1390) of cases 
were linked to live poultry, five outbreaks or 15.4% (214/1390) of cases to reptiles, one 
outbreak or 4.0% (56/1390) of cases to dairy calves and one outbreak or 0.7% 
(10/1390) to guinea pigs (Table 2). 62.9% (874/1390) had AST and/or WGS results. 
When comparing the epidemiology of all outbreaks to the above subsets with 
>25% WGS (n=18 outbreaks) and ≥ 10 isolates and >25% with WGS (n=16 outbreaks), 
the only percentages that differed between the groups (32, 18, 16) were the maximum 
age (106 years, 101 years, 101 years), maximum % hospitalized (55.6%, 55.6%, 
47.6%), maximum % exposed to the vehicle (100%, 88.9%, 88.9%), minimum data 
availability for hospitalization (56.5%, 61.1%, 61.1%) and death (56.5%, 61.1%, 61.1%) 
and maximum data availability for hospitalization (100%, 94.7%, 94.7%) and death 
(100%, 94.7%, 94.7%) (Table 3). Because epidemiologic variables were identical or 
very similar between the complete group and subsets, the full data set was reviewed for 
antimicrobial resistance patterns. 
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Epidemiologic Comparison between full case data to subset of isolates with 
antimicrobial resistance data 
For the outbreaks in which more than 25% of the isolates were sequenced for 
predicted (genotypic) resistance (n=18), the subset of patients with resistance data 
within each outbreak were not substantively different from the full patient set. All 
outbreak minimum ages were within 1 year  (67% were identical), and 89% of maximum 
and median ages were with 10 years of each other (67% and 17% were identical). 
Outbreak level epidemiologic variables were within 10 percentage points in 89% of 
outbreaks for the percent female, hospitalized, and exposed. 94% of outbreaks had 
identical rates of death between the full set and subset with resistance data. 
Of the remaining 14 outbreaks that did not meet that 25% sequenced threshold, 
a further eight outbreaks had whole genome sequencing performed on 10–23% of 
cases representing between three and 30 isolates. Between the full set and the subset 
with resistance data outbreak level minimum ages were within one year for 75% of 
outbreaks (three were identical), maximum ages were within 10 years for 50% of 
outbreaks, and median ages were within 10 years for 88% of outbreaks. Outbreak level 
epidemiologic variables were within 10 percentage points of each other for female in 
38% of outbreaks, hospitalization in 38% of outbreaks, death in 100% of outbreaks, and 
exposure in 50% of outbreaks.  
Due to the minimal data available for race and ethnicity, these variables were not 
compared or analyzed between the complete outbreak epidemiology and the subset 
with resistance data. Even though outbreaks with less than 25% of isolates sequenced 
were not as representative of the whole as the outbreaks with a larger percentage with 
WGS, we evaluated the overall resistance patterns of all the outbreaks to get the most 
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data on resistance patterns and resistance concordance between AST and WGS 
results. These limitations were taken into account when interpreting the resistance 
patterns.  
Descriptive Epidemiology of Antimicrobial Resistance 
From the 32 outbreaks associated with zoonotic salmonellosis 85.0% of cases 
were from outbreaks linked to live poultry, 12.6% of cases were from reptile-associated 
outbreaks, 2.1% of cases were from dairy calf-associated outbreaks, and 0.4% of cases 
were from guinea pig-associated outbreaks (Table 4; Figure 1). Of the 16 outbreaks 
where at least one isolate was found to have antimicrobial resistance, 11 were 
associated with live poultry (n=1522, 86.8% of cases), three with reptiles (n=166, 9.5% 
of cases), one with dairy calves (n=56 cases, 3.2% of cases), and one with guinea pigs 
(n=10, 0.6% of cases) (Figure 1). Of the 10 outbreaks (n=599) where no isolates were 
found to have antimicrobial resistance, seven were associated with live poultry (n=529, 
88.3% of cases) and three were associated with reptiles (n=70, 11.7% of cases). Finally 
of the 6 outbreaks (n=338) where antimicrobial susceptibility testing was not available, 
five were associated with live poultry (n=236, 69.8% of cases) and one with reptiles 
(n=102, 30.2% of cases). 
Salmonella serotypes represented in outbreaks with documented resistance 
included Braenderup, Enteritidis, Hadar, Infantis, I 4,[5],12:I, Indiana, Litchfield, 
Mbandaka and Typhimurium in live poultry, Heidelberg in dairy calves, Agbeni, 
Mbandaka, and Paratyphi B Var. L(+) Tartrate in reptiles, and Enteritidis in guinea pigs. 
Salmonella serotypes in outbreaks with no documented resistance included Enteritidis, 
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Indiana, Infantis, Mbandaka, Muenchen, and Muenster in live poultry-associated 
outbreaks and Muenchen, Pomona, and Fluntern in reptile-associated outbreaks. 
Of the 1030 isolated tested for antimicrobial resistance with AST or Pred-R, 
19.2% (n=198) were resistant to at least one antimicrobial agent. Isolates from live 
poultry-associated outbreaks made up 82.2% (n=847) of isolates tested and 71.7% 
(n=142) of isolates with resistance; those from reptile-associated outbreaks made up 
11.4% (n=117) of isolates tested and 4.0% (n=10) of resistant isolates; and guinea pig 
isolates comprised 1.0% (n=10) of isolates tested and 0.5% (n=1) of antimicrobial 
resistant isolates. In contrast isolates from dairy calf outbreaks were overrepresented 
since they included 4.7% (n=48) of isolates tested and 24.1% (n=47) of isolates with 
antimicrobial resistance. Overall 16.4% (139/847) of isolates from live poultry-
associated outbreaks, 6.8% (8/117) of isolates from reptile-associated outbreak, 97.9% 
(47/48) of isolates from the dairy calf-associated outbreak, and 10.0% (1/10) of isolates 
from the guinea pig-associated outbreak had documented resistance to at least one 
antimicrobial agent (Table 4). 
For each of the 13 antimicrobial drugs included in the NARMS AST panel 
between 2015-2018, resistance to each drug was noted in four to eleven outbreaks 
(median = 8) (Table 5). Of the 16 outbreaks where any type of resistance was 
documented, resistance to azithromycin was noted in the smallest number of outbreaks 
(4/16, 25%) and resistance to Streptomycin was noted in the most number of outbreaks 
(11/16,68.8%). Two antimicrobial drugs, for which there are known resistance genes, 
and which were also found in outbreak WGS data, were fosfomycin (n=1 outbreak) and 
kanamycin (n=2 outbreaks). In the case of the outbreak in which fosfomycin resistance 
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was predicted from WGS, AST results showed no phenotypic resistance because 
fosfomycin is not part of the standard NARMS panel. 
For the 16 outbreaks and 198 isolates demonstrating resistance to at least one 
antimicrobial drug, there were 40 unique patterns of resistance to between one and 
eleven antimicrobial drugs. The most common patterns were 
ACSSuTAuCxFoxCip(I)Kan (n=30, 15.4% from three outbreaks), SSuGen (n=26, 13.3% 
from 10 outbreaks), T (n=23, 11.8% from 10 outbreaks), AAuCxFox (n=22, 11.3% from 
12 outbreaks), and SSuTGen (n=17, 8.7% from 8 outbreaks) (Table 6). The remaining 
35 patterns were seen in one (0.5%) to eight (4.1%) isolates. All but one pattern (NalCip 
= nalidixic acid, ciprofloxacin), which was found in both live poultry and reptile-
associated outbreaks, were unique to the implicated vehicle. Live poultry-associated 
outbreaks included 28 unique resistance patterns, reptile-associated included four, dairy 
calf-associated included nine, and guinea pig-associated included only one resistance 
pattern (Table 6). 71.7% of isolates with documented resistance (13.8% of isolates 
tested) demonstrated multidrug resistance (i.e., defined as resistance to three or more 
antimicrobial drugs). 
When broken down by frequency of resistance to each antimicrobial drug, 
resistance to streptomycin (S) was the most prevalent among isolates with resistance 
(126/198, 63.6%) followed by sulfisoxazole (Su) (117/198, 59.1%), tetracycline 
(109/198, 55.1%), and ampicillin (88/198, 44.4%) (Figure 3.3). The antimicrobial drug 
with the lowest prevalence of resistance was azithromycin (2% of isolates with 
resistance) found only in live poultry and reptile outbreaks. When resistance to 
individual antimicrobials was broken out by the implicated vehicle, outbreaks linked to 
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farm animals (i.e., live poultry and dairy calves) show resistance to 12 and 13 
antimicrobial drugs (including kanamycin) while outbreaks linked to pets (i.e., reptile and 
guinea pig) show resistance to nine and three antimicrobial drugs respectively. 
The outbreak involving dairy calves stands out from the other outbreak vehicles 
in having isolates with both a diversity of resistance (12 different antimicrobial drugs, 
eight of nine CLSI Drug Classes) as well as the high prevalence of resistance (over 
70%) to 10 antimicrobial drugs (Figure 3.3). All resistant isolates (n=47) were resistant 
to 4 antibiotics (i.e., streptomycin, sulfisoxazole, chloramphenicol, and tetracycline) and 
46 of 47 were resistant to a further 4 antibiotics (ampicillin, amoxicillin-clavulanic acid, 
ceftriaxone, and cefoxitin), Although outbreak isolates were all Salmonella serotype 
Heidelberg, there were six distinct PFGE patterns with resistance patterns in the 
outbreak compared to live poultry outbreaks, of which seven of eleven outbreaks with 
antimicrobial resistance had only one PFGE pattern for the resistant isolates. 
Resistant isolates from live poultry outbreaks showed the highest prevalence of 
resistance to streptomycin (54.7%), sulfisoxazole (48.9%), tetracycline (43.9%) and 
gentamicin (32.4%). In contrast, resistance among reptile outbreak isolates was the 
highest for ciprofloxacin (75%) and nalidixic acid (75%). The single isolate with 
resistance from the outbreak associated with guinea pigs showed resistance to 
streptomycin, sulfisoxazole, and trimethoprim-sulfamethoxazole. While resistance to 11 
of the 14 possible antimicrobials was found in isolates three of the four outbreak vehicle 
types, resistance to kanamycin and azithromycin was found only in live poultry and 
reptile-associated outbreaks, and resistance to gentamicin was only seen in live poultry 
outbreaks (Figure 3.3). 
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When the epidemiology of the resistant isolates was compared to the non-
resistant isolates, the maximum (89 yrs., 101 yrs.) and median (20 yrs., 25 yrs.) patient 
age was lower in cases with resistant isolates, and the percent hospitalized and with 
known exposure was higher in cases with resistant isolates (32.2%, 27.8% and 68.5% 
vs. 56.0%) (Table 7). A lower proportion of resistant isolates were from blood (2.6% vs. 
4.9%) and from females (52.7% vs. 55.5%). Although race and ethnicity differed, the 
number with available data made it impossible to compare the two groups.  
When comparing cases of live poultry-associated salmonellosis with resistant 
isolates (n=142) to those with non-resistant isolates (n=713), those with resistant 
isolates had lower maximum (83 yrs., 101 yrs.) and median (26.0 yrs., 28.0 yrs.) ages, a 
lower proportion of females (49.6%, 55.4%), and a higher rate of hospitalization (33.3%, 
25.2%) and reported exposure to the vehicle (69.4%, 56.3%) (Table 8). In reptile-
associated outbreaks of salmonellosis, cases with resistant isolates (n=8) had a higher 
proportion of females (87.5%, 57.5%), a lower maximum (40 yrs., 100 yrs.) and median 
(9.0 yrs., 13 yrs.) age, a lower hospitalization rate (0%, 46.4%), and a higher rate of 
exposure to the vehicle (80.0% vs. 52.1%) than cases with non-resistant isolates 
(n=109). No persons with resistant isolates died compared to one person with a non-
resistant isolate each for a live poultry and reptile-associated outbreak. A similar 
comparison between resistant and susceptible isolates was not possible for guinea pigs 
and dairy calves because there was only one resistant isolate from the guinea pig-
associated outbreak and only one susceptible isolate from the dairy calf-associated 
outbreak.  
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Whole Genome Sequencing Trees 
The NARMS lab created WGS trees for 26 of 32 outbreaks (i.e., 24 hqSNP trees, 
2 wgMLST trees). In addition, three samples from the 2015 outbreak of Salmonella 
Hadar were included on the 2016 hqSNP tree of Salmonella Hadar because they were 
highly related to the 2016 outbreak strains. In some WGS trees, antimicrobial-resistant 
isolates were spread across clades, such as in the 2015–2017 outbreak of Salmonella 
Heidelberg linked to dairy calves that had resistant isolates in both main clades. Clade 
A isolates were 0–21 SNPs apart, and they were 15–39 SNPs apart from Clade B, 
which included isolates 2–13 SNPs apart. In contrast, the 2017 live poultry-associated 
outbreak of Salmonella Hadar, which had five clades, showed antimicrobial-resistant 
isolates limited to clade E or after.  
Of the 198 isolates for which resistance was documented through phenotypic 
and genotypic testing, 44% (n=87) were included on the trees, and 56% (n=111) were 
not included on the trees. During the Salmonella Litchfield outbreak associated with live 
poultry in 2017, no WGS tree was requested; however, sequencing and resistance data 
were available from patient isolates from this outbreak. 
Resistance Concordance 
Of the 116 samples with both AST and WGS results, 78% had identical 
phenotypic and genotypic resistance profiles. The remaining 22% (n=26) of isolates 
were found to have discordant antimicrobial resistance patterns for one (n=17), three 
(n=5), four (n=3), or five antimicrobial drugs (n=1) that included amoxicillin-clavulanic 
acid, azithromycin, chloramphenicol, fosfomycin, kanamycin, nalidixic acid, 
streptomycin, tetracycline, and trimethoprim-sulfamethoxazole. Since discordance 
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occurred for more than one antimicrobial, an explanation was needed for each 
discrepancy. An expert biostatistician in the CDC NARMS verified the reason for 
discrepancies in 19 of these 26 isolates based on knowledge of AST panel versus WGS 
Pred-R protocols and established characteristics of resistance determinance genes 
bringing the rate of concordance up to 94% of isolates with both phenotypic and 
genotypic resistance testing (KT, personal communication). In 18 isolates the predicted 
resistance determinant found on WGS was not part of the standard NARMS AST panel 
at the time of testing (fosfomycin, n=10, kanamycin, n=8). For the remaining isolates 
antimicrobial resistance was documented on AST but not on the Pred-R because of the 
presence of the novel gene dfrA34 (trimethoprim-sulfamethoxazole, n=8 isolates), 
because the qnrB19 gene is not used to predict nalidixic acid resistance (n=6 isolates), 
and on Pred-R but not on AST because a mutation in the floR gene caused a 
nonfunctional gene product conferring no resistance to chloramphenicol (n=6 isolates). 
The remaining seven discrepancies, representing 6.4% (7/109) of isolates with both 
AST and WGS, have theorized reasons for discrepancies including a known 
streptomycin mismatch between AST and Pred-R results due to lower specificity and 
positive predictive value than other antibiotics (McDermott et al, 2016) (n=2), 
susceptibility testing at the edge of the susceptible bell curve (n=2), and the possibility 
of plasmid loss prior to testing or low coverage genes (n=3). 
Discussion 
Epidemiologic Trends 
Regardless of vehicle type the minimum age in all outbreaks was aged <1 year, 
and in over 50% outbreaks, the minimum age was aged <1 month. Median ages was 
 34 
seven months to 56 years, and in 28% of outbreaks (n=9), the median patient age was 
<10 years, which suggests that parents and caregivers of young children are 
appropriate targets for public health education and interventions (CDC, Information for 
Health Care Professional and Laboratories, 2018). Since outbreak level maximum age 
exceeded 65 years in 90% of outbreaks, the elderly should also be considered a 
vulnerable group for zoonotic salmonellosis. These two groups (infants and individuals 
aged >65 years) are known to be at increased risk of serious disease or complications 
from Salmonella infections (CDC, Information for Health Care Providers, 2018). Since 
the age demographic held true all animal vehicles of salmonellosis, public health 
messaging regarding vulnerable groups can be consistent for zoonotic salmonellosis in 
general. 
Additionally, women were the majority of the patients in 66% of outbreaks, and 
they continued to represent the majority of cases even after stratifying by the outbreak 
vehicle. Although the 90% to 100% outbreak level data availability on gender made 
conclusions possible, the lack of consistent racial and ethnicity data made it difficult to 
draw any firm conclusions about overall trends; however, for the 34.4% of outbreaks 
(n=11/32) in which racial data were available, the majority of cases reported being white 
in all but 1 outbreak. 
Data on health outcomes (i.e., hospitalization and death) were available for over 
66% of patients in over 90% of outbreaks. Prevalence of hospitalization was as low as 
12.5% and as high as 55.6% at the outbreak level, but at least 25% of patients were 
hospitalized in 72% of all outbreaks. When stratified by outbreak vehicle, reptile-
associated (37.9% of cases) and dairy calf-associated (34.7% of cases) outbreaks saw 
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higher rates of hospitalization than outbreaks associated with live poultry (28.9%) and 
guinea pig (12.5%). This higher rate of hospitalization for reptile and dairy calf outbreaks 
held true for outbreaks in which AST and WGS were carried out (n=26) regardless of 
whether any isolates in the outbreak were found to have antimicrobial resistance. 
Death occurred in 0.2% of the 2691 patients identified, of which five were in live 
poultry outbreaks and one was in reptile-associated outbreak representing 0.3% and 
0.4% of cases respectively. Given the relatively small number of cases associated with 
dairy calves and guinea pigs compared to live poultry and reptiles, no conclusion about 
trend can be made from this data. 
Extent and persistence of outbreaks and pattern of outbreaks by vehicle type  
Outbreaks associated with live poultry contact represented the majority (85.0%, 
2287/2691) of patients over the study period compared to reptiles (12.6%), dairy calves 
(2.1%) or guinea pigs (0.4%). This difference persisted for the subset of outbreaks that 
had at least 25% of isolates sequenced (18 outbreaks, 78.8% linked to live poultry) and 
those that had both more than 25% of isolates sequenced and a minimum of 10 isolates 
sequenced (16 outbreaks, 79.2% linked to live poultry). Although not recorded in this 
paper because the outbreak was ongoing during the data analysis phase, there was 
another outbreak of live poultry-associated salmonellosis in 2018 involving a further 334 
cases, 56 hospitalizations, and zero deaths, and the outbreak investigation of 
Salmonella Heidelberg from 2015–2017 was also reopened in 2018 (CDC, Multistate 
Outbreaks of Salmonella Infections Linked to Contact with Live Poultry, 2018). These 
outbreaks were not included in this analysis because the data analysis including AST 
and WGS were not completed at the time of writing. 
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Antimicrobial Resistance 
Resistance data were available for 38% of all outbreak isolates, and 18.7% of 
isolates tested for antimicrobial resistance through phenotypic and/or genotypic tests 
showed resistance to at least one antimicrobial drug. While some isolates were only 
resistant to one antimicrobial drug, 71.7% isolates with any resistance were resistant to 
three or more antimicrobial drugs, which is the NARMS convention for multi-drug 
resistance. The study data showed a higher prevalence of resistance to five or more 
antimicrobial drugs (5.8% of isolates) than was previously reported in NARMS data from 
foodborne Salmonella outbreaks (i.e., 5% of non-typhoidal Salmonella isolates) (CDC, 
2013). 
Although there were 40 unique patterns of antimicrobial resistance found in these 
outbreaks, isolates from live poultry outbreaks showed the most variability with 28 
patterns from 11 outbreaks comprising eight Salmonella serotypes (Braenderup, 
Enteritidis, Hadar, I 4,[5],12:I, Indiana, Infantis, Litchfield, Mbandaka, and Typhimurium) 
compared to reptiles with three outbreaks, three serotypes (Agbeni, Paratyphi B Var. 
L(+) Tartrate, and Mbandaka), and four resistance patterns, and to dairy calves with one 
outbreak, one serotype (Heidelberg), and nine resistance patterns. No conclusions can 
be drawn from the pattern in guinea pigs since only one isolate showed resistance 
(serotype Enteritidis). Of these serotypes, Enteritidis, Indiana, Infantis, and Mbandaka 
were also seen in outbreaks where no resistance was documented; however, these 
outbreaks had lower overall proportions of antimicrobial susceptibility testing (i.e., 
10.9% in Mbandaka, 10% for Enteritidis, 17.3% for Indiana from 2016) or low number of 
isolates tested (e.g., Infantis, 2017, n=12 tested). Because of the variety of resistance 
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patterns in and between outbreak vehicle types and the finding that some serotypes 
were found in outbreaks both with and without AMR, health care professionals cannot 
rely solely on the Salmonella serotype for antimicrobial drug choice. 
When stratified by vehicle, only the combined resistance pattern of nalidixic acid 
and ciprofloxacin (i.e., NalCip) was seen in both live poultry-associated and reptile-
associated outbreaks; however, since resistance to 11 of 14 antimicrobial drugs was 
seen from isolates in outbreaks associated with three different species types, multidrug 
resistance was a problem common to all the vehicle species in this study and should be 
suspected and investigated in any type of zoonotic Salmonella enterica outbreak. 
Although most cases of salmonellosis do not require antibiotics, treatment is 
recommended for patients with risk factors (e.g., immune compromise, young children 
or the elderly) or those with severe infections (e.g., invasive disease, blood stream 
infections) (Shane et al., 2017). In these cases, first line treatment includes 
ciprofloxacin, ceftriaxone and azithromycin and their alternatives ampicillin and 
trimethoprim-sulfamethoxazole (Shane et al., 2017). Although resistance to 
streptomycin (12.2% of isolates tested) was the most prevalent, resistance to all of 
these recommended treatment options occurred – ampicillin (8.5% of isolates tested), 
ceftriaxone (6.8% of isolates tested), ciprofloxacin (5.8% of isolates tested), 
trimethoprim-sulfamethoxazole (2.4% of isolates tested), and azithromycin (0.4% of 
isolates tested). 
Since 97.9% (47/48) of dairy calf-associated salmonellosis tested by AST and/or 
WGS showed antimicrobial resistance, and since this outbreak has been reopened, this 
should raise concern about doctors’ ability to treat patients given that the past outbreak 
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strains demonstrated resistance to six to eleven distinct antibiotics from eight of nine 
drug classes included on the NARMS AST panel. Of specific concern was the high 
prevalence of resistance to the first line (ciprofloxacin (100%), ceftriaxone (97.9%)) and 
second-line (ampicillin (97.9%) and trimethoprim-sulfamethoxazole (17%) antimicrobial 
drugs used to treat severe cases of salmonellosis (Shane et al., 2017). Only 
azithromycin was not represented among the resistance profiles in this outbreak.  
When comparing the epidemiology of patients with antimicrobial resistant strains 
of Salmonella to that of patients with susceptible strains, the median age was lower in 
the former group for all isolates as well as the subset of live poultry-associated and 
reptile-associated outbreaks. The higher prevalence of hospitalization for cases with 
resistant isolates compared to susceptible isolates indicated a greater severity of 
infection and was consistent with findings in foodborne outbreaks of non-typhoidal 
Salmonella (Brown et al., 2016). 
Resistance Concordance 
Although at first pass AST and WGS predicted resistance results are concordant 
in 78% of isolates (90/116), a further 16% of isolates were explained by differences 
between the standard NARMS AST panel and WGS testing as well as known 
relationships between resistance genes and phenotypic resistance related to 
trimethoprim-sulfamethoxazole, chloramphenicol, and nalidixic acid. This left only 6% of 
isolates whose discordance was theorized to be due to possible plasmid loss in the 
bacteria between sampling and testing, the known lower specificity and positive 
predictive value for streptomycin that has since prompted a change in NARMS 
interpretive criteria for streptomycin (McDermott et al., 2016), and limitations of 
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interpretations on susceptibility testing (i.e., defining cut-off points at the edges of the 
susceptibility “bell curve”). 
Since most state public health laboratories are certified to do whole genome 
sequencing rather than having to ship samples to the CDC for testing, it is likely that 
WGS will become more common in outbreak investigation and response. As noted by 
McDermott et al., culture-independent methods including whole genome sequencing are 
becoming more common as they allow a single workflow and do not require labs to 
maintain “quality typing sera” and specialized training and reagents” (2016). Therefore it 
is vital that there is an understanding of ways in which AST and Pred-R may not align 
as well as how to interpret these instances of discordance to help clinicians make 
clinical choices and to understand outbreak epidemiology. By demonstrating which 
types of resistance discordance are common amongst zoonotic outbreak, the NARMS 
team can develop standardized guidance and protocols for testing and interpretation of 
results that will help health care professionals make decisions about antimicrobial use 
for patients with animal-associated salmonellosis. 
Limitations 
Underdiagnosis and underreporting of enteric illness can occur at any point along 
the surveillance pathway from the individuals who are minimally affected or who cannot 
or will not seek help from a healthcare provider, to lack of diagnosis or testing by health 
care provider, or failing to report or submit samples to the relevant public health 
authority of outbreak reporting system. In these cases, it is possible that underreporting 
of subclinical or mild cases will bias the case population to more severe disease 
resulting in hospitalization or death. While some data for patients were close to 
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complete or complete (e.g., age, gender, exposure to the vehicle), other data was 
lacking (e.g., race, ethnicity) or variable depending on the outbreak (e.g., 
hospitalization, death). In the latter case, it is possible that the cases missing data about 
hospitalization or death might have been different in some way from the cases for whom 
data were present. 
While it might have been interesting to investigate trends in resistance over time 
for zoonotic outbreaks, there was only one outbreak in guinea pigs and one in dairy 
calves, and the outbreaks from 2015 and 2016 have much smaller proportions of 
isolates that had resistance testing than in outbreaks from 2017 to 2018. In the future, 
more trends may emerge as the proportion of samples tested increases and hqSNP and 
wgMLST trees continue to be the norm for outbreaks. 
Since only 11.3% (116/1030) of those tested had both AST and Pred-R, it was 
challenging to make conclusions about the nature of resistance concordance between 
the two testing modalities when it comes to zoonotic salmonellosis outbreaks. A further 
17 additional Pred-R results could not be downloaded from the PulseNet computer due 
to technical issues with the hardware but will be analyzed if become available.  
In this study, we did not include plasmid DNA as part of our resistance profile 
because the short reading sequence does not allow the lab to definitively prove whether 
the gene is on the plasmid or the bacteria itself. It is expensive and time-consuming to 
confirm the locations of genes; therefore, only the presence of resistance genes and 
where relevant, the presence of a partial or full mutation in the quinolone resistance 
determining region that would predict intermediate or complete resistance to nalidixic 
acid (i.e., Nal) and ciprofloxacin (Cip), were included in this study. 
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Opportunities for Further Research 
Given the continuing increase in proportion of isolates undergoing WGS, more 
data will be available to better characterize both the epidemiology and resistance profile 
of zoonotic outbreaks of salmonellosis. Since WGS is increasingly prevalent as a testing 
methodology due faster results and increased laboratory certification, it is important to 
understand whether this newer technology can be as useful as the older AST. AST is 
necessary as it allows labs to obtain PFGE pattern for outbreak surveillance and 
response and shows the true behavior of the bacteria and whether the resistance genes 
it has are expressed in vivo. To further explore resistance concordance and 
mechanisms of discordance between results, a systematic analysis of isolates from 
zoonotic outbreaks of Salmonella should be undertaken. Given the cost associated with 
such testing, resources should be directed to outbreaks with that have shown the 
highest prevalence of discordance (i.e., dairy calves, nine of 26 discordant samples) 
and antimicrobial resistance. Since this outbreak investigation has been reopened in 
2018, this could be done prospectively. 
Although WGS trees are typically constructed during active outbreaks and 
finalized when an outbreak is closed, the CDC performs active surveillance by reaching 
out to state and large metropolitan public health departments to request representative 
outbreak samples, and states submit their requisite one of every 20 Salmonella samples 
to PulseNet as part of passive surveillance. This is reflected in the zoonotic outbreaks in 
this study as only 44% of resistant isolates (n=87) were included on the finalized WGS 
trees for outbreaks. Since WGS and resistance data for outbreak isolates are often 
generated after outbreaks are closed, this reduces a bias toward resistant isolates 
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because resistance patterns for outbreaks are not generally known at the time of 
outbreak closure. Resource and time permitting, new outbreak WGS trees could be 
constructed that retrospectively include additional cases that have been sequenced but 
were not included on the original trees to better understand how WGS tree clade 
position and/or PFGE pattern relate to resistance patterns. For example, the 2017 
outbreaks of Salmonella Braenderup, Hadar and Typhimurium linked to live poultry had 
43, 35, and 45 isolates, respectively, on the final WGS tree, but there were a further 
103, 106 and 98 isolates respectively that have sequencing data that could be 
incorporated into a new tree. Similarly for the complex and highly resistance isolates 
from the outbreak of Salmonella Heidelberg attributed to dairy calves, there were 15 
isolates on the WGS tree but a further 33 with sequencing data. Recreating a WGS tree 
is not typically done once an outbreak is considered closed; however, in light of the 
complicated patterns of resistance, it might be possible to request that a new tree be 
created. 
While not analyzed in this study, isolates from food (e.g. chicken, pork, beef), 
animals (e.g., swabs, organs, and feces), and the environment were present in the 
majority of outbreaks and found to be highly related by PFGE and WGS. They were 
present in the outbreak hqSNP or wgMLST trees and have been part of the standard 
NORS outbreak closeout summaries. Statistical testing including Fisher’s exact and 
Wilcoxon rank sum tests should be used to compare the prevalence of phenotypic and 
genotypic resistance patterns between non-human and human isolates as well as to 
further characterize the statistical significance of any differences noted in epidemiologic 
variables and health outcomes between patients with resistant and susceptible isolates 
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or between patients from outbreaks of the different vehicle types. These tests will 
increase the level of understanding of the source and spread of bacterial isolates 
between hosts directly or through fomites including those with antimicrobial resistance. 
Conclusions 
Zoonotic outbreaks of Salmonella present ongoing challenge to the health of the 
public and in particular vulnerable groups such  as children aged <five years and adults 
aged >65 years. The continued presence of highly related isolates from year to year 
indicates a persistent need for outbreak investigation and public heath interventions. 
Given that the prevalence of hospitalization, a proxy for case severity, was as high as 
one of every three cases for live poultry, reptile, and dairy calf-associated outbreaks, 
these outbreaks represent a serious threat to public health. They indicate a need to 
strengthen and support surveillance systems between municipal, state, and federal 
partners and will require coordination of experts in human and animal health as well as 
collaborations with individuals who are empowered to make changes in practices 
throughout the animal distribution chain from the point of origin, such as a producer or 
breeder to consumer. 
Even as there is a switch from traditional culture and susceptibility testing to 
culture-independent and genetic testing, reflex cultures for positive samples is required 
to elicit isolate PFGE patterns and support outbreak surveillance mechanisms through 
PulseNet and NORS. Further research that includes performing phenotypic and 
genotypic resistance testing on patient isolates from zoonotic salmonellosis outbreaks 
will be needed to understand whether interpretation of resistance discordance in 
foodborne outbreaks of Salmonella can be extrapolated to these outbreaks as well. 
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Finally given the continued budgetary and personnel pressures that public health 
departments face, it is vital to understand the most efficient use of public health dollars 
and to support research into methods that allow more testing for the same amount of 
money without creating undue burden on state and local health departments. 
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CHAPTER 4 PUBLIC HEALTH LEADERSHIP CONTEXT OF ZOONOTIC 
SALMONELLOSIS AND ANTIMICROBIAL RESISTANCE 
4.1 Public Health Threat of Zoonotic Salmonellosis and Antimicrobial Resistance 
Antimicrobial resistance is a growing concern at the local level for health care 
providers and hospitals and at the national (e.g., AVMA, CDC, FDA, USDA) and global 
level where organizations such as the World Health Organization (WHO), World 
Organisation for Animal Health (OIE), and the Food and Agriculture Organization (FAO) 
are working independently as well as in a triagency coordination to combat antimicrobial 
resistance. The CDC has published Core Elements of Antimicrobial Stewardship for 
Hospitals (CDC, 2014), Nursing Homes (CDC, 2015), and Outpatient Clinics (Sanchez 
et al., 2017) as well as specific applications for small and critical access hospitals 
whose needs and resources may differ from their larger counterparts (5CDC, 2017). 
Similarly in veterinary medicine, individual species groups have adopted judicious use 
and antimicrobial stewardship guidelines, and the AVMA’s Committee on Antimicrobials 
drafted and the House of Delegates unanimously passed the Definition and Core 
Elements of Antimicrobial Stewardship in Veterinary Medicine in January of 2018 
(AVMA, 2018). This work in human and animal medicine was made possible through 
the contributions of many stakeholders representing both professional organizations as 
well as the perspectives of the frontline health care providers to apply the science of 
what is known about antimicrobial stewardship to its practical applications. 
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Although more research into the mechanisms by which antimicrobial resistant 
strains of bacteria spread is needed, the trans global movement of people, animals, and 
goods has been implicated in some outbreaks since related resistant strains of bacterial 
isolates have been found across the globe in humans, animals, and the environment. Of 
the estimated 1.2 million cases of non-typhoidal Salmonella in the US annually, the 
CDC reports that 1.1 million are acquired domestically, which translates into the 
remaining 100,000 people (8.3%) with internationally-acquired infections (CDC, 
Questions and Answers | Salmonella, 2018,). In addition, the 9% of domestically 
acquired infections were thought to be acquired through non-food sources such as 
contaminated pet food, infected animals, and the environment where animals are 
housed (e.g., aquariums, pens, cages) 
While this analysis focused on the epidemiology and resistance patterns of 
human patients linked to multistate outbreaks, isolates from food (e.g. chicken, pork, 
beef), animals (e.g., swabs, internal organs, cecal samples, or fecal samples), and the 
environment (e.g., turtle water or aquarium swab, duck straw, bedding, enclosures) 
were analyzed during these outbreaks and been found to be highly related through 
WGS. Since these zoonotic outbreaks typically covered a large number of states, the 
need for and strength of the NNDSS, NORS and PulseNet for passive and active 
surveillance is evident. It also requires the active engagement of physicians, 
veterinarians, laboratorians, public health professionals and federal partners in the FDA 
and the Food Safety and Inspection Service (FSIS) within the Animal, Plant Health 
Inspection Service (USDA APHIS). 
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In addition to finding closely related isolates from multiple states or from multiple 
sources (human, animal, food, environment), PFGE or WGS matches in PulseNet from 
past outbreaks suggest that bacterial strains can persist and spread. For example, the 
2017 outbreaks of Salmonella Agbeni linked to turtles contained patient isolates that 
were closely related to a 2016 outbreak and samples from a street vendor selling turtles 
in 2015 (CDC, Multistate Outbreak of Salmonella Agbeni Infections Linked to Pet 
Turtles, 2017 (Final Update), 2018). Similarly outbreaks of Salmonella related to live 
poultry, of which there were 53 between 1990–2014 (average 3.5 outbreaks/year) and 
23 between 2015–2018 (average 7.7 outbreaks/year), show related samples from past 
years (e.g., Salmonella Hadar and Muenster outbreaks associated with live poultry that 
where 2015 outbreak isolates were highly related to 2016 isolates) (Basler et al., 2016; 
CDC, Don’t Play Chicken With Your Health, 2018). 
Finding a historical isolate as part of an ongoing outbreak can also provide 
insight into whether control measures or interventions that had been suggested were 
implemented by the source of the outbreak vehicle. A good example of the 
consequences of failing to implement public health interventions is underscored by the 
outbreak of salmonellosis related to guinea pigs, which was considered closed in 2018. 
Patients in this outbreak were exposed between July 2015 and December 2017; 
however, a patient sample from 2010 was found to only one SNP different than a 
patient in this later outbreak (Robertson et al., 2018). In this case, a genetic link 
between isolates revealed a common wholesaler at the beginning of the supply chain 
that led to individuals purchasing guinea pigs, and it was found that prior interventions 
including environmental testing were not implemented (Robertson et al., 2018).  
 48 
4.2 One Health and Antimicrobial Stewardship 
Given the ongoing and persistent outbreaks of zoonotic salmonellosis that span 
human, animal, and environmental domains, addressing antimicrobial resistance will not 
be easily tackled by a single entity or domain. As defined by the AVMA, antimicrobial 
stewardship for veterinary medicine is “the actions veterinarians take individually and as 
a profession to preserve the effectiveness and availability of antimicrobial drugs through 
conscientious oversight and responsible medical decision-making while safeguarding 
animal, public, and environmental health.” The goal to preserve the effectiveness and 
availability of antimicrobials drugs is shared by human, animal and public health 
counterparts; however, the capability of resistant bacterial populations to spread from 
person to person, from the environment (e.g., soil, water and air), and to and from 
animals, means that collaboration solely between health care sectors will not be 
adequate to address this problem. A problem this widespread, serious and complex 
demands systems-level thinking and the engagement of stakeholders in agriculture, 
policy making, industry groups and businesses focused on animal breeding, distribution, 
and sale, and pharmaceutical groups and manufacturers researching and developing 
new antimicrobials, antimicrobial alternatives, and preventive care (e.g., vaccines, 
immune modulators) in a One Health approach. 
4.3 Public Health Professionals as Chief Health Strategist 
My work on the AVMA Committee on Antimicrobials and my practicum with 
colleagues at the CDC including those in ORPB and NARMS have expanded my 
understanding of the complexity of the issue of zoonotic disease and antimicrobial 
resistance and the relevance of the concept of the public health professional as the 
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Chief Health Strategist proposed by the DeSalvo et al. (2016). Rather than doing all of 
the work, the chief health strategist must engage and mobilize community partners to 
act to improve the “upstream” social determinants of health (DeSalvo et al., 2016; 
RESOLVE, 2014). A successful public health leader should adopt the principles of 
transformational leadership in which the leader creates a collective vision that inspires 
others to take action. After exploring the public health threat of zoonotic salmonellosis 
and antimicrobial resistance from the perspectives of infectious disease, surveillance, 
policy, global health, research and leadership perspectives, I recognize that a common 
theme to taking next steps in all of these areas is identifying and engaging stakeholders.  
4.4 Stakeholder Analysis 
No matter the intervention, it is critical to define not only who the stakeholders 
are but also to determine what their current level of support and influence is, how 
influential their participation will be in the change process, and how and when to engage 
them in interventions. An effective public health leader should be able to help 
stakeholders understand their role in the complex web of an issue such as antimicrobial 
resistance and help them appreciate how their involvement is critical to the success of 
the intervention. It is also helpful to repeat the stakeholder analysis using different tools 
depending on what action you might take while taking care to consider stakeholders at 
all levels of the socioecological model (individual, interpersonal, 
community/organizational, and societal/policy). There are multiple ways to analyze the 
stakeholders in an issue, and I have included sample figures that I developed to 
consider stakeholders for live poultry-associated salmonellosis (Figures 4.1 – 4.4). 
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To begin, a STEP scan is useful for brainstorming what individuals or groups are 
affected or influential and assigning them to the relevant Social, Technical, Economic, 
and Political groups (Aguilar, 1967). In the case of live poultry this might include the 
distribution network from breeders to distributors to stores and finally customers (Figure 
4.1). With small adjustments, this and the other stakeholder figures could apply to the 
other animal vehicles covered in this study (reptiles, dairy calves, or guinea pigs). 
Secondly the Center for Community Health and Development’s Community Tool 
Box takes the perspective of primary, secondary and tertiary stakeholders (Community 
Tool Box, 2017). Their designations are tiered based on who is affected (primary), who 
is responsible for those affected (secondary), and who can exert influence to affect 
change for the public health threat. The type of influence an individual or group has can 
then relate back to the original STEP scan as social, technical, economic and policy 
influence are all involved particularly in a complex issue such as antimicrobial 
resistance. 
Next, I would consider each stakeholder in their level of current support as well 
as the level of support needed to promote health behavior changes that support 
infection control and antimicrobial stewardship along the lines of the International 
Association for Public Participations (IAP2) Spectrum of Public Participation and Type of 
Involvement from Stakeholders (www.iap2.org). It is important to perform this analysis 
to gauge how to efficiently use limited public health resources (i.e., money, people, 
supplies). In the case of live poultry-associated salmonellosis veterinarians, public 
health departments, and pediatricians could be expected to support for interventions to 
protect the health of children; however, pediatricians are more likely than either of the 
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other groups to influence others to make a change since they are trusted figures in the 
lives of parents of young children and are authority figures due to their medical degrees. 
(Figure 4.2). By contrast, hatcheries and feed store owners may resist public health 
interventions seen as intrusive and burdensome to their business practice; however, 
despite this expected resistance, if they can support change, their behavior is expected 
to have a moderate effect on improving public health. 
Once the decision has been made to engage particular stakeholders, the IAP2 
Spectrum of Public Participation is helpful in deciding whether it is most appropriate to 
inform, consult, involve, collaborate or empower each stakeholder. Each level allows 
more participation by the stakeholder and shifts the responsibility for making and 
implementing decisions from a more centralized to a more diffuse structure (Figure 4.3) 
(IAP2, 2014). On the low end of participation, the authority figure or institution only 
interacts with the public to educate and inform them about the problem or what 
behaviors to adopt to protect themselves. On the upper end of participation, the public is 
empowered to make the decisions, and the public health organization commits to 
implementing what the public decides. In my example of live poultry-associated 
salmonellosis, I would chose to seek collaborations with day care and preschool 
educators. These educators are secondary stakeholders since they care for children 
aged <5 years, who are overrepresented in Salmonella outbreaks, and their influence is 
high because they decide whether baby chicks or ducks will be handled in the 
classroom (CDC, Salmonella infection | Healthy Pets, Healthy People, 2018). In that 
case, it was important to assimilate the educator expertise into the context of 
Salmonella prevention to collectively determine what options the educators preferred 
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and would be able to implement (IAP2, 2014). In contrast, subject matter experts on 
salmonellosis and poultry (e.g., CDC, veterinarians) would be consulted to inform the 
issue but their involvement in decision making would be less because they don’t set 
protocols or implement preventive strategies in schools or daycares. 
4.5 Leadership at all levels 
The result of all these ways of looking at stakeholders in the context of zoonotic 
salmonellosis and antimicrobial resistance results is a mental model and stakeholder 
map that is a complex web of interactions (Figure 4.4). To build the trust and vision that 
change is both necessary and possible requires a transformational leader with keen 
emotional intelligence to understand what is important for themselves and others and 
who can use persuasive tools to convince others of the vision and its possibility, 
express confidence in themselves and others, and demonstrate how it can be done 
(Yukl, 2012, pg. 332-5). The benefits of adopting a transformational leadership style 
were demonstrated by Carlton et al. (2015), who found strong and statistically 
significant correlations between a leader’s transformational leadership style and 
leadership outcomes (e.g., extra effort, effectiveness and satisfaction), which did not 
hold for leaders who self-described as transactional leaders (i.e., ones who used 
contingent awards or active management-by-exception). 
While Yukl describes transformational leadership as a group of behaviors 
(idealized influence, individual consideration, inspirational motivation, and intellectual 
stimulation), a survey of public health professionals in the UK found that public health 
superheroes were commonly found to have talents in mentoring-nurturing, shaping-
organizing, networking-connecting, knowing-interpreting and advocating-impacting 
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(Yukl, 2012, pg. 322; Day et al., 2014). Kouzes and Posner go further and describe 5 
leadership behaviors that put the theory of transformational leadership into practice – 
Model the Way, Inspire a Shared Vision, Challenge the Process, Enable Others to Act, 
Encourage the Heart (2012). The promising conclusion is that these effective leadership 
traits and skills can be encouraged and taught to anyone in a process of lifelong 
learning not just a select few who have them innately (Day et al., 2014; Kouzes and 
Posner, 2012; Yukl, 2012). Using the added step of creating organizational or inter-
organizational support systems as proposed by Upshaw (Module 2, Lesson 6, 
9/25/2017) aids the process of continual improvement in transformational leadership. By 
taking a perspective of promoting ‘leadership at all levels,’ and considering that 
“leadership is everyone’s business’ a transformational leader can enhance the process 
of making connections and building up support systems by empowering others to lead 
(Day et al., 2014; Kouzes and Posner, 2012). 
Leadership is required at every level of the society from individuals and 
organizations (e.g., schools, hospitals, feed stores) to policy makers and should focus 
on stakeholders identified as playing an important role in contributing to the success of 
the intervention. When thinking outside the more natural realm of health whether animal 
or human, the importance of leadership from other groups becomes apparent. When 
applied to zoonotic salmonellosis, and in particular, outbreaks linked to live poultry, 
some stakeholders whose leadership is essential to carrying the message and practice 
of prevention are:  
1. Breeders and suppliers – Helping businesses take ownership of their role in 
rearing and raising healthy animals, implementing biosecurity and infection 
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control protocols to keep facilities clean and free of disease while acknowledging 
that these actions decrease but do not eliminate the possibility of Salmonella 
carriage in live birds 
2. Distributors – Emphasizing infection control and improved signage on shipping 
containers with live birds 
3. Feed and farm stores - Encouraging feed store owners that sell live poultry to 
take action to limit customer access to birds, particularly children, through use of 
barriers and fencing around displays of chicks and to prevent young children 
handling chicks 
4. Pet stores – Aiding management in crafting good sanitation, hygiene and 
antimicrobial stewardship protocols and in ensuring compliance by local stores 
and employees 
4.5 Change Management 
As a public health leader it will be critical to help these and other organizations 
see their role in the complex stakeholder map, to persuade these groups that zoonotic 
infections and antimicrobial resistance is something they should care about, and to 
move these critical organizations and individuals through a change process that 
improves infection control, reduces the inappropriate use of antimicrobials and supports 
rapid outbreak identification and response both on the human and animal sides while 
leaving in place support structures that makes the change sustainable. Yukl describes 
the 4 stages of change that individuals and organization must go through when 
confronted with a request to change. These are overcoming denial, channeling anger, 
mourning without depression and optimism about adaptation (Yukl, 2012, pg. 79-81). In 
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order to get buy-in from stakeholders, barriers to change will need to be overcome 
including perceptions that change is not necessary, not feasible, not cost-effective or 
that there is a lack of established trust between stakeholders.  
While it is beyond the scope of this paper to go into change management 
strategies in details, the need for public health leaders to continually improve their skills 
in mentoring-nurturing, shaping-organizing, networking-connecting, knowing-interpreting 
and advocating-impacting holds true despite variations in the type and complexity of 
barriers to change (Day et al., 2014). These skills will be needed to address 
stakeholders both within and outside the health care because the existing mental model 
for many is to view antimicrobial drugs as plentiful and essential for treating symptoms 
of illness. For those with this mental models, there is no consideration as to how to use 
antimicrobials more judiciously because there is no awareness that antimicrobials are 
not appropriate in every case of sneezes and sniffles, for example, that resistant 
bacterial strains are becoming more prevalent making many drugs useless where 
previously they were effective, and that treating resistant infections comes at a medical, 
economic, and physical cost to the patient and health care system. An increased 
awareness, a culture shift, and sometimes difficult behavior changes will be required on 
the part of patients and prescribers (both human and veterinary) to reduce the demand 
for and the inappropriate prescribing of antimicrobials.  
4.6 Conclusion 
Combatting antimicrobial resistance and preserving the effectiveness of 
antimicrobial drugs will require collaboration and synergy at all levels for progress to be 
made. Leaders with an understanding of the urgency of the threat to health and a vision 
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of what is possible will be needed at all levels of the socioecological model as well as 
from all four quadrants of the STEP scan. A perspective of continuous learning and an 
optimism that leadership skills can be learned and improved as well as a commitment to 
sharing these skills and knowledge with others to increase their leadership potential is 
key to inspiring and beginning the change process as well as to creating strong support 
structures that will sustain changes that preserve the effectiveness and availability of 
antimicrobial drugs and promote the promote the health and well being of people and 
animals. 
 Table 1: Antimicrobial agents used for susceptibility testing for Salmonella isolates by the NARMS laboratory in the US, 2015–2018 
 
Source: https://www.cdc.gov/narms/reports/annual-human-isolates-report-2015.html (Table 2) 
https://www.cdc.gov/narms/antibiotics-tested.html#modalIdString_CDCTable_0 (Table Salmonella) 
 
 
 
Table 2: Comparison of case and outbreak counts based on proportion and number of isolates with whole genome sequencing in 
zoonotic salmonellosis outbreaks in the US, 2015–2018 
 
>25% = Subset of outbreaks with at least 25% of case isolates having whole genome sequencing 
>25%, ≥10 = Subset of outbreaks with at least 25% of case isolates having whole genome sequencing totaling 10 or more isolates 
 
CLSI Class Antimicrobial Agent NARMS Code Antibiotic Short Key
Aminoglycosides Gentamicin Gen GEN
Streptomycin S STR
Beta-lactams/Beta-lactamase inhibitor combinations Amoxicillin-clavulanic acid Au AUG
Cephems Ceftriaxone Cx AXO
Cefoxitin Fox FOX
Folate pathway inhibitors Sulfisoxazole Su SMX
Trimethoprim-sulfamethoxazole Cot COT
Macrolides Azithromycin Azm AZM
Penicillin Ampicillin A AMP
Phenicols Chloramphenicol C CHL
Quinolones Ciprofloxacin Cip CIP
Nalidixic acid Nal NAL
Tetracyclines Tetracycline T TET
All >25% >25%,≥ 10 All >25% >25%,≥ 10 All >25% >25%,≥ 10 All >25% >25%,≥ 10
Outbreaks 23 10 9 7 6 5 1 1 1 1 1 1
Cases 2287 1121 1110 338 236 214 56 56 56 10 10 10
% of total cases 85.0% 78.8% 79.9% 12.6% 16.6% 15.4% 2.1% 3.9% 4.0% 0.4% 0.7% 0.7%
Cases with AST and/or WGS 855 713 706 117 117 110 48 48 48 10 10 10
% of total tested 83.0% 80.3% 80.8% 11.4% 13.2% 12.6% 4.7% 5.4% 5.5% 1.0% 1.1% 1.1%
% tested by vehicle 37.4% 63.6% 63.6% 34.6% 49.6% 51.4% 85.7% 85.7% 85.7% 100% 100% 100%
Guinea PigsDairy CalvesReptilesLive Poultry
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Table 3: Comparative Epidemiology of Outbreaks of Zoonotic Salmonellosis in the United States 
between all outbreaks, a subset of outbreaks that had WGS for > 25%, and a subset of outbreaks 
with at least 10 isolates with WGS that constitute > 25% of isolates, 20 
 
* Bold format indicates difference from other subsets of outbreaks 
>25% = Subset of outbreaks with at least 25% of case isolates having whole genome sequencing 
>25%, ≥10 = Subset of outbreaks with at least 25% of case isolates having whole genome sequencing 
totaling 10 or more isolates with whole genome sequencing  
Demographic proportions are a percent of isolates for which results were recorded. Demographic 
questions left blank or marked as 'unknown,' 'don't know,' or 'did not answer' were excluded. 
Age of 0.00 refers to age less than 1 month. 
 
Outbreaks (#)
Cases (#)
Min Max Min Max Min Max
Source
Blood 0.0% 22.4% 0.0% 22.4% 0.0% 22.4%
Stool 64.5% 100.0% 64.5% 100.0% 64.5% 100.0%
Urine 0.0% 16.7% 0.0% 16.7% 0.0% 16.7%
Other 0.0% 9.1% 0.0% 9.1% 0.0% 9.1%
Age (years)
Minimum 0 1 0 1 0 1
Maximum 53 106 53 101 53 101
Median 1 56 1 56 1 56
Gender
Female (%) 41.5% 81.8% 41.5% 81.8% 41.5% 81.8%
Race
White (%) 35.7% 100% 35.7% 100% 35.7% 100.0%
Black (%) 0% 50.0% 0% 50.0% 0.0% 50.0%
Other (%) 0% 18.9% 0% 16.7% 0.0% 16.7%
Ethnicity
Hispanic/Latino (%) 0% 68.8% 0.0% 68.8% 0.0% 68.8%
Hospitalized
Yes (%) 12.5% 55.6% 12.5% 55.6% 12.5% 47.6%
Died
Yes (%) 0% 9.1% 0% 9.1% 0.0% 9.1%
Exposure to vehicle
Yes (%) 9.5% 100.0% 9.5% 88.9% 9.5% 88.9%
Data Availability
Age 91.7% 100.0% 91.7% 100.0% 91.7% 100.0%
Gender 90.0% 100.0% 90.0% 100.0% 90.0% 100.0%
Race 0.0% 70.0% 0.0% 70.0% 0.0% 70.0%
Ethnicity 0.0% 70.0% 0.0% 70.0% 0.0% 70.0%
Hospitalization 56.5% 100% 61.1% 100% 61.1% 100.0%
Death 56.5% 100% 61.1% 100% 61.1% 100.0%
Exposure 49.4% 100.0% 49.4% 94.7% 49.4% 94.7%
All outbreaks >25% Sequenced >25% &  ≥10 Sequenced
32
2691
18
1423
16
1390
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Table 4: Human Cases of Zoonotic Salmonellosis Compared by Implicated Vehicle and Presence 
of Antimicrobial Resistance in the US, 2015–2018 
 
*Count and percent of isolates for which results were recorded. Demographic questions left blank or 
marked as 'unknown,' 'don't know,' or 'did not answer' were excluded. 
^ Age 0.0 = infant less than 1 month old 
AMR = Antimicrobial Resistance 
AST = Antimicrobial Susceptibility Testing 
PredR = Predicted Resistance from whole genome sequencing 
 
 
 
Table 5: Antimicrobial Resistance in Zoonotic Salmonella enterica outbreaks for antimicrobial 
drugs included in the standard NARMS AST Panel, 2015–2018 
 
Of the 32 possible outbreaks, 26 had antimicrobial susceptibility testing data. 
 
All AMR No AMR NR All AMR No AMR NR All AMR All AMR
Outbreaks 23 11 7 5 7 3 3 1 1 1 1 1
Cases
# 2287 1522 529 236 338 166 70 102 56 56 10 10
% 85.0% 86.8% 88.3% 69.8% 12.6% 9.5% 11.7% 30.2% 2.1% 3.2% 0.4% 0.6%
Isolates with AST or PredR
% 37.0% 50.1% 16.1% N/A 34.6% 50.0% 48.6% N/A 85.7% 85.7% 100% 100%
# 847 762 85 N/A 117 83 34 N/A 48 48 10 10
Isolates with AMR
% of tested 16.8% 18.6% 0% N/A 6.8% 9.6% 0% N/A 97.9% 97.9% 10.0% 10.0%
# 142 142 0 N/A 8 8 0 N/A 47 47 1 1
Age (years)*^
Min 0.00 0.08 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.06 0.00 0.02 0.17 0.17 1.00 1.00
Max 106 106 92 89 100 100 58 83 89 89 70 70
Gender*
Female (%) 53.3% 54.5% 50.4% 51.9% 54.2% 57.3% 51.5% 51.0% 56.4% 56.4% 55.6% 55.6%
Female (#) 1194 812 262 120 176 90 35 51 31 31 5 5
Hospitalized*
Yes (%) 28.9% 28.6% 26.3% 38.6% 37.9% 40.7% 40.0% 32.5% 34.7% 34.7% 12.5% 12.5%
Yes (#) 524 345 118 61 96 57 12 27 17 17 1 1
Died*
Yes (%) 0.3% 0.3% 0.2% 0% 0.4% 0.7% 0% 0% 0% 0% 0% 0%
Yes (#) 5 4 1 0 1 1 0 0 0 0 0 0
Exposure to vehicle*
Yes (%) 65.7% 54.8% 89.9% 69.5% 51.8% 51.6% 47.2% 54.2% 63.0% 63.0% 75.0% 75.0%
Yes (#) 1118 594 419 105 128 66 17 45 34 34 6 6
Guinea PigsDairy CalvesLive Poultry Reptiles
CLSI Class Antimicrobial Agent Outbreaks with ≥ 1 resistant isolate)
Outbreaks with 
resistance (n=26)
Aminoglycosides Gentamicin 8 31%
Streptomycin 11 42%
Beta-lactams/Beta-lactamase inhibitor combinations Amoxicillin-clavulanic acid 9 35%
Cephems Ceftriaxone 8 31%
Cefoxitin 7 27%
Folate pathway inhibitors Sulfisoxazole 10 38%
Trimethoprim-sulfamethoxazole 6 23%
Macrolides Azithromycin 4 15%
Penicillin Ampicillin 9 35%
Phenicols Chloramphenicol 7 27%
Quinolones Ciprofloxacin 7 27%
Nalidixic acid 7 27%
Tetracyclines Tetracycline 10 38%
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Table 6: Resistance Patterns among Human Isolates of Zoonotic Salmonellosis in the US by 
Vehicle, 2015–2018 (n=198 isolates with resistance) 
 
* Resistance pattern seen in more than one type of vehicle. 
(I) = Intermediate Resistance 
 
Pattern Resistant Isolates (#)
A 6
ACSSu 1
ACSSuT 2
ACSSuTCotNalCip(I)GenAzm 1
ACSTAuAzm 1
ASTAuCxFox 1
ASuCot 5
AT 1
AAuCxFox 21
ACip(I) 1
CS 1
CSSu 3
CSSuT 1
CSSuTCot 4
CSSuCot 2
CSSuCotNalCip(I) 1
CSuTCot 1
S 6
SSuTCot 1
SSuTGen 17
SSuGen 27
SSuGenKanAzm 1
ST 8
Su 1
SuCot 1
T 23
NalCip(I)* 3
Cip(I) 1
Pattern Resistant Isolates (#)
AAuCxFox 2
CTNalCipAzm 1
CNalCip 1
NalCip and NalCip(I)* 4
Key
NARMS Code Antibiotic
ACSSuTAuCxFoxCotNalCip 3 A Ampicillin
ACSSuTAuCxFoxCip(I) 5 C Chloramphenicol
ACSSuTAuCxFoxCip(I)Kan 30 S Streptomycin
ACSSuTAuCxFoxCip(I)KanFos 1 Su Sulfisoxazole
ASSuTAuCxFoxCotNalCip 3 T Tetracycline
ASSuTAuCxFoxCotCip 2 Au Amoxicillin-clavulanic acid
ASSuTAuCxFoxCip 1 Cx Ceftriaxone
ASSuTAuCxFoxCip(I)KanFos 1 Fox Cefoxitin
CSSuTCip(I)Kan 1 Cot Trimethoprim-sulfamethoxazole
Nal Nalidixic Acid
Cip Ciprofloxacin
Pattern Resistant Isolates (#) Gen Gentamicin
SSuCot 1 Azm Azithromycin
Dairy Calves
Reptiles
Live Poultry
Guinea Pigs
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Table 7: Epidemiology of Isolates tested with AST or Pred-R from Zoonotic Outbreaks of 
Salmonellosis Compared by the Presence Antimicrobial Resistance in the US, 2015–2018 
 
Count and percent are for isolates with recorded results. Demographic questions left blank or marked as 
'unknown,' 'don't know,' or 'did not answer' were excluded. 
 	  
% ( # ) % ( # )
Source Site
Blood 2.6% (5) 5.0% (41)
Stool 89.5% (170) 87.6% (715)
Urine 7.4% (14) 6.3% (51)
Other 0.5% (1) 1.1% (9)
Age (years)
Minimum 0.08 0.08
Maximum 89 101
Median 20 25
Gender
Female (%) 52.9% (100) 55.7% (451)
Race
White (%) 100% (6) 81.8% (27)
Black (%) 0.0% 15.2% (5)
Other (%) 0.0% 3.0% (1)
Ethnicity
Hispanic/Latino (%) 66.7% (2) 25.0% (10)
Hospitalized
Yes (%) 32.2% (55) 27.6% (185)
Died
Yes (%) 0.0% 0.3% (2)
Exposure to vehicle
Yes (%) 68.5% (111) 56.0% (339)
Resistance 
(n=198)
No Resistance 
(n=832)
 62 
Table 8: Epidemiology of Isolates tested with AST or Pred-R from Zoonotic Outbreaks of 
Salmonellosis Compared by the Presence of Absence of Antimicrobial Resistance by Vehicle, 
2015–2018 
 
Count and percent are for isolates with recorded results. 
AMR = Antimicrobial Resistance 
No AMR = Susceptible to all antimicrobials tested. 
  
Source Site
Blood 0.0% 3.6% (25) 0.0% 15.0% (16) 10.6% (5) 0% 0.0% 0.0%
Stool 90.3% (121) 90.0% (629) 87.5% (7) 72.0% (77) 87.2% (41) 100% (1) 100% (1) 88.9% (8)
Urine 9.0% (12) 5.7% (40) 12.5% (1) 9.3% (10) 2.1% (1) 0% 0.0% 11.1% (1)
Other 0.7% (1) 0.7% (5) 0.0% 3.7% (4) 0.0% 0% 0.0% 0.0%
Age (years)
Minimum 0.08 0.08 0.17 0.17 0.17 N/A N/A 1.0
Maximum 83.0 101.0 40.0 100.0 89.00 N/A N/A 70.0
Median 26.0 28.0 9.0 13.0 16.50 N/A N/A 12.0
Gender
Female (%) 49.6% (66) 55.4% (385) 87.5% 57.5% (61) 55.3% (26) 100% 100% (1) 50.0% (4)
Race
White (%) N/A 100% (6) N/A 71.4% (15) 100% (5) N/A 100% (1) 100% (6)
Black (%) N/A 0.0% N/A 23.8% (5) 0.0% N/A 0.0% 0.0%
Other (%) N/A 0.0% N/A 4.8% (1) 0.0% N/A 0.0% 0.0%
Ethnicity
Hispanic/Latino (%) N/A 16.7% (1) N/A 32.1% (9) 100% (2) N/A 0.0% 0.0%
Hospitalized
Yes (%) 33.3% (40) 25.2% (145) 0.0% 46.4% (39) 32.6% (14) N/A 100% (1) 0.0%
Died
Yes (%) 0.0% 0.2% (1) 0.0% 1.2% (1) 0.0% N/A 0.0% 0.0%
Exposure to vehicle
Yes (%) 69.4% (77) 56.3% (296) 80.0% (4) 52.1% (37) 64.4% (29) 100% 100% (1) 71.4% (5)
Guinea PigsPoultry
No AMR 
(n=109) AMR (n=47)
No AMR 
(n=1)
AMR 
(n=142)
No AMR 
(n=713) AMR (n=8)
Reptiles Dairy Calves
No AMR 
(n=9)AMR (n=1)
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Figure 3.1 Relative Prevalence of Implicated Vehicles in Zoonotic Salmonellosis Outbreaks 
Categorized by the Presence of Outbreak Level Antimicrobial Resistance in the US, 2015–2018 
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Figure 3.2 Prevalence of Resistance to Individual NARMS Antimicrobial Drugs Among 198 Human 
Isolates of Zoonotic Salmonellosis with Documented Resistance by AST and/or WGS, 2015–2018 
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 Figure 3.3 Prevalence of Antimicrobial Resistance in 198 Human Isolates of Zoonotic Salmonellosis with Documented Resistance in 
the US by Vehicle, 2015–2018 
 
* Kanamycin is not on the standard NARMS AST panel but is part of genetic resistance testing. 
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Figure 4.1 Example of STEP Scan for Stakeholders in the Context of Live Poultry Associated 
Salmonellosis in the United States 
 
 
 
Figure 4.2 Example of the IAP2 Spectrum of Public Participation in the Context of Live Poultry 
Associated Salmonellosis in the United States 
 
Source:https://cdn.ymaws.com/www.iap2.org/resource/resmgr/foundations_course/IAP2_P2_Spectrum_F
INAL.pdf 
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Figure 4.3 Example of IAP2’s Type of Involvement in the Context of Live Poultry Associated 
Salmonellosis in the United States 
 
Source: www.iap2.org 
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 Figure 4.4 Example of Stakeholder Mapping in the Context of Live Poultry Associated Salmonellosis in the United States 
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APPENDIX 1. RESISTANCE PROFILES FOR OUTBREAKS OF ZOONOTIC 
SALMONELLOSIS BY WHOLE GENOME SEQUENCING TREE CLADE 
DESCRIPTIONS, 2015-2018 
 
Continued next page 
Outbreak WGS Tree Clade Human Isolates Distance within Clade PFGE Pattern Resistance Pattern Isolates with AMR (#)
1605MLJBP-1 Braenderup A (Main) 25 0-14 JBPX01.0039 AAuCxFox 4
Live Poultry 29-75 to B JBPX01.0039 S 2
JBPX01.0039 SSuGen 2
JBPX01.0039 SSuGenKanAzm 1
B 5 JBPX01.0039 None 0
1604MLTDK-1 Hadar A 17 0-14 TDKX01.0049 T 1
Live Poultry
1604MLJFX-1 Infantis A (Main) 19 0-16 JFXX01.0081 T 5
Live Poultry 55-72 to next clade JFXX01.0081 SSuTGen 1
B 7 0-6 JFXX01.0081 T 1
C 1 17-25 JFXX01.0081 None 0
1704MLTDK-1 Braenderup A 27 0-7 JBPX01.0002 A 1
Live Poultry 124-213 to Clade B JBPX01.0002 AAuCxFox 2
JBPX01.0002 CSSu 1
JBPX01.0002 CSSuTCot 2
JBPX01.0002 SSuGen 4
B (unrelated) 16 0-84 JBPX01.0002 AAuCxFox 1
Extra not on tree 103 N/A JBPX01.0002 Cip(I) 1
JBPX01.0002, JBPX01.0039 AAuCxFox 4
JBPX01.0002, JBPX01.0039 S 2
JBPX01.0039 A 1
JBPX01.0039 CSuTCot 1
JBPX01.0039 SSuGen 1
JBPX01.0008 SSuTGen 3
JBPX01.0039 T 1
JBPX01.0039 NalCip(I) 1
1704MLTDK-1 Enteritidis Before A 6 JEGX01.0004 None 0
Live Poultry A 13 0-15 JEGX01.0004 None 0
B 1 0-14 JEGX01.0021 None 0
Between B&C 5 JEGX01.0021 None 0
C 3 2-5 JEGX01.0005 None 0
D 1 0-6 JEGX01.0005 None 0
E 45 JEGX01.0005 A 2
JEGX01.0005 ACSTAuAzm 1
JEGX01.0005 ACip(I) 1
JEGX01.0005 NalCip(I) 1
After E 4 JEGX01.0005 AT 1
Extra not on tree 26 JEGX01.0004 None 0
25 JEGX01.0005 NalCip(I) 1
JEGX01.0005 A 1
2 JEGX01.0021 None 0
1704MLTDK-1 Hadar A 32 0-19 (48-80 to B) TDKX01.0049 AAuCxFox 1
Live Poultry TDKX01.0049 SSuGen 3
TDKX01.0049 SSuTGen 2
B 3 0-4 TDKX01.0049 ST 3
Extra not on tree 106 N/A TDKX01.0049 AAuCxFox 1
TDKX01.0049 CSSu 1
TDKX01.0049 CSSuT 1
TDKX01.0049 CSSuCot 2
TDKX01.0049 CSSuCotNalCip(I) 1
TDKX01.0049 S 1
TDKX01.0049 SSuGen 2
TDKX01.0049 SSuTGen 3
TDKX01.0049 Su 1
TDKX01.0049 SuCot 1
TDKX01.0049 ST 1
TDKX01.0049 T 1
1704MLTDK-1 I 4,[5],12:i A 5 0-4 (0-49 to B) JPXX01.1071 T 5
Live Poultry B 3 0 (0-59 to C) JPXX01.1071 None 0
C 3 0-3 (0-59 to D) JPXX01.1071 None 0
D 3 0-10 JPXX01.1071 T 3
Extra not on tree 9 N/A JPXX01.1071 T 4
1704MLTDK-1 Indiana A 4 0-4 (4-8 to clade B) JFPX01.0049 SSuGen 1
Live Poultry B 3 0-2 JFPX01.0049 None 0
Extra not on tree 18 N/A JFPX01.0049 None 0
1704MLTDK-1 Litchfield No tree requested 17 JGXX01.0009 ACSSuT 2
Live Poultry JGXX01.0009 ASTAuCxFox 1
JGXX01.0009 CSSuTCot 2
JGXX01.0009 ST 4
JGXX01.0009 SSuTGen 1
JGXX01.0009 T 1
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APPENDIX 1. RESISTANCE PROFILES FOR OUTBREAKS OF ZOONOTIC 
SALMONELLOSIS BY WHOLE GENOME SEQUENCING TREE CLADE 
DESCRIPTIONS, 2015-2018 (CONT.) 
 
 
Outbreak WGS Tree Clade Human Isolates Distance within Clade PFGE Pattern Resistance Pattern Isolates with AMR (#)
1704MLTDK-1 Mbandaka A 26 0-6 (54-88 to B) TDRX01.0011 A 1
Live Poultry TDRX01.0011 AAuCxFox 1
TDRX01.0011 SSuGen 1
B (unrelated) 4 0-4 TDRX01.0067 None 0
Extra not on tree 40 N/A TDRX01.0011 AAuCxFox 2
TDRX01.0067 S 1
TDRX01.0067 SSuGen 1
TDRX01.0067 SSuTGen 1
1704MLTDK-1 Typhimurium A 30 0-5 JPXX01.0033 AAuCxFox 1
Live Poultry JPXX01.0033 SSuTGen 1
JPXX01.0033 SSuGen 4
A 4 JPXX01.5209 ASuCot 4
Between A&B 4 JPXX01.0033 None 0
B (unrelated) 7 0-2 JPXX01.0351 None 0
Extra not on tree 98 JPXX01.0033 ACSSu 1
JPXX01.1289 ACSSuTCotNalCip(I)GenAzm 1
JPXX01.5209 ASuCot 1
JPXX01.0033 AAuCxFox 4
JPXX01.0033 CS 1
JPXX01.0033 CSSu 1
JPXX01.0033 SSuGen 8
JPXX01.0033 SSuTGen 5
JPXX01.0033 SSuTCot 1
JPXX01.0033 T 1
Total Resistant Isolates 142
Resistant isolates on WGS tree 65
Extra isolates not on tree 77
1701MLJRF-1 A 15 1-14 JRFX01.0018 AAuCxFox 1
Turtles Outlier 2 JRFX01.0018 None 0
Extra not on tree 5 N/A JRFX01.0018 AAuCxFox 1
1706MLJRF-1 A 35 0-18 JRFX01.0018 None 0
Turtles Extra not on tree 12 N/A JRFX01.0018 NalCip(I) 1
1707 MLJKX-1 A 2 2 JKXX01.0861 NalCip 1
Snakes JKXX01.0861 NalCip(I) 1
B 3 23-24 JKXX01.0861 NalCip(I) 1
JKXX01.0861 CNalCip 1
JKXX01.0861 CTNalCipAzm 1
Extra not on tree 6 N/A TDRX01.0005 None 0
Total Resistant Isolates 8
Resistant isolates on WGS tree 6
Extra isolates not on tree 2
1608WIJF6-1 A 11 0-21 JF6X01.0523,JFX01.0646 ACSSuTAuCxFoxCip(I) 3
Dairy Calves (15-39 to next) JF6X01.0523 ACSSuTAuCxFoxCip(I)Kan 5
JF6X01.0523 ASSuTAuCxFoxCotNalCip 2
JF6X01.0523 ASSuTAuCxFoxCip(I)KanFos 1
B 4 2-13 JF6X01.0590 ACSSuTAuCxFoxCip(I) 1
(15-20 to next) JF6X01.0590 ACSSuTAuCxFoxCotNalCip 1
JF6X01.0590 ACSSuTAuCxFoxCip(I)Kan 2
Outlier N/A JF6X01.0824 N/A N/A
Extra not on tree 33 N/A JF6X01.0523 ACSSuTAuCxFoxCip(I) 1
JF6X01.0523, 0590, 0805, 0811 ACSSuTAuCxFoxCip(I)Kan 23
JF6X01.0805 ACSSuTAuCxFoxCip(I)KanFos 1
JF6X01.0523 ACSSuTAuCxFoxCotNalCip 2
JF6X01.0646 ASSuTAuCxFoxCip 1
JF6X01.0523, JF6X01.0811 ASSuTAuCxFoxCotCip 2
JF6X01.0523 ASSuTAuCxFoxCotNalCip 1
JF6X01.0523 CSSuTCip(I)Kan 1
JF6X01.0824 None 0
Total Resistant Isolates 47
Resistant isolates on WGS tree 15
Extra isolates not on tree 32
1801COJEG-1 A 7 0-18 JEGX01.0021 None 0
Guinea Pigs B 2 1 JEGX01.0021 SSuCot 1
Extra not on tree 1 N/A JEGX01.0021 None 0
Total Resistant Isolates 1
Resistant isolates on WGS tree 1
Extra isolates not on tree 0
 71 
REFERENCES 
Aguilar, F. (1967). Scanning the business environment. New York (N.Y.): Macmillan. 
American Veterinary Medical Association [AVMA]. (2018). Antimicrobial stewardship 
definition and core principles. Retrieved from 
https://www.avma.org/KB/Policies/Pages/Antimicrobial-Stewardship-Definition-
and-Core-Principles.aspx 
Basler, C., Nguyen, T., Anderson, T. C., Hancock, T., & Behravesh, C. (2016). 
Outbreaks of Human Salmonella Infections Associated with Live Poultry, United 
States, 1990–2014. Emerging Infectious Diseases, 22(10), 1705-1711.  
Brown, A. C., Grass, J. E., Richardson, L. C., Nisler, A. L., Bicknese, A. S., & Gould, L. 
H. (2016). Antimicrobial resistance in Salmonella that caused foodborne disease 
outbreaks: United States, 2003-2012. Epidemiology and infection, 145(4), 766-
774. 
Carlton, E., Holsinger, J., Riddell, M., & Bush, H. (2015). Full-Range Public Health 
Leadership, Part 1: Quantitative Analysis. Frontiers In Public Health, 3. doi: 
10.3389/fpubh.2015.00073. 
Centers for Disease Control and Prevention [CDC]. (n.d.). Don’t play chicken with your 
health. Retrieved from https://www.cdc.gov/healthypets/resources/15_261877-
b_dont_play_chicken_with_your_health_508compliant.pdf 
CDC. (n.d.). Outbreak Infographic. Retrieved from 
https://www.cdc.gov/foodsafety/outbreaks/pdfs/outbreak-infographic.pdf  
CDC. (n.d.). Salmonellosis | Summary | NNDSS. Retrieved from 
https://wwwn.cdc.gov/nndss/conditions/salmonellosis/  
CDC. (n.d.). Salmonellosis | 2017 Case Definition. Retrieved from 
https://wwwn.cdc.gov/nndss/conditions/salmonellosis/case-definition/2017/  
CDC. (1999). Ten great public health achievements—United States, 1900–1999. 
MMWR Morbidity And Mortality Weekly Report, 48, 241–243. 
CDC. (2013). Antibiotic Resistant Threats in the United States, 2013. Atlanta, Georgia: 
U.S. Department of Health and Human Services, CDC. 
CDC. (2014). Core Elements of Hospital Antibiotic Stewardship Programs. Atlanta, GA: 
US Department of Health and Human Services, CDC. Retrieved from 
https://www.cdc.gov/antibiotic-use/healthcare/pdfs/core-elements.pdf 
CDC. (2015). The Core Elements of Antibiotic Stewardship for Nursing Homes. Atlanta, 
GA: US Department of Health and Human Services, CDC. Retrieved from 
http://www.cdc.gov/longtermcare/index.html  
 72 
CDC. (2015). Timeline for Reporting Cases of Salmonella Infection | Salmonella | CDC. 
Retrieved from https://www.cdc.gov/salmonella/reporting-timeline.html  
CDC. (2016). About FoodNet | FoodNet | CDC. Retrieved from 
https://www.cdc.gov/foodnet/about.html  
CDC. (2016). Frequently Asked Questions | About | PulseNet | CDC. Retrieved from 
https://www.cdc.gov/pulsenet/about/faq.html#future  
CDC. (2016). Outbreak Detection | PulseNet | CDC. Retrieved from 
https://www.cdc.gov/pulsenet/outbreak-detection/index.html  
CDC. (2017). Implementation of Antibiotic Stewardship Core Elements at Small and 
Critical Access Hospitals. Retrieved from https://www.cdc.gov/antibiotic-
use/healthcare/pdfs/core-elements-small-critical.pdf 
CDC. (2017). Surveillance Case Definition | Salmonella. Retrieved from 
https://wwwn.cdc.gov/nndss/conditions/salmonellosis/case-definition/2017/  
CDC. (2018). About NORS | National Outbreak Reporting System (NORS) | CDC. 
(2018). Retrieved from https://www.cdc.gov/nors/about.html  
CDC. (2018). Enteric Disease Laboratory Branch Isolate Submission Table. Retrieved 
from https://www.cdc.gov/ncezid/dfwed/pdfs/edlb-isolate-submission-table-
508c.pdf  
CDC. (2018). Enteric Zoonoses Activity | ORPB | DFWED | NCEZID | CDC. Retrieved 
from https://www.cdc.gov/ncezid/dfwed/orpb/eza.html  
CDC. (2018). Information for Healthcare Professionals | Salmonella | CDC. Retrieved 
from https://www.cdc.gov/salmonella/general/technical.html  
CDC. (2018). Multistate Outbreaks of Salmonella Infections Linked to Contact with Live 
Poultry in Backyard Flocks, 2018 (Final Update). Retrieved from 
https://www.cdc.gov/salmonella/backyard-flocks-06-18/index.html  
CDC. (2018). Multistate Outbreak of Salmonella Agbeni Infections Linked to Pet Turtles, 
2017 (Final Update). Retrieved from https://www.cdc.gov/salmonella/agbeni-08-
17/index.html  
CDC. (2018). National Antimicrobial Resistance Monitoring System for Enteric Bacteria 
(NARMS) | NARMS | CDC. Retrieved from https://www.cdc.gov/narms/index.html  
CDC. (2018). National Antimicrobial Resistance Monitoring System for Enteric Bacteria 
(NARMS): Human Isolates Surveillance Report for 2015 (Final Report). Retrieved 
from https://www.cdc.gov/narms/reports/annual-human-isolates-report-2015.html  
 73 
CDC. (2018). Questions and Answers | Salmonella | CDC. (2016). Retrieved from 
https://www.cdc.gov/salmonella/general/index.html  
CDC. (2018). Salmonella infection | Healthy Pets, Healthy People. Retrieved from 
https://www.cdc.gov/healthypets/diseases/salmonella.html  
CDC. (2018). Salmonella | Surveillance. Retrieved from 
https://www.cdc.gov/salmonella/reportspubs/surveillance.html  
CDC. (2018). US Outbreaks of Zoonotic Diseases Spread between Animals & People | 
Healthy Pets, Healthy People | CDC. Retrieved from 
https://www.cdc.gov/healthypets/outbreaks.html  
CDC. (2018). What Exactly is Antibiotic Resistance? Retrieved from 
https://www.cdc.gov/drugresistance/about.html  
Community Tool Box. (2017). Chapter 7. Encouraging Involvement in Community Work 
| Section 8. Identifying and Analyzing Stakeholders and Their Interests. Retrieved 
from http://ctb.ku.edu/en/table-of-contents/participation/encouraging-
involvement/identify-stakeholders/main  
Day, M., Shickle, D., Smith, K., Zakariasen, K., Moskol, J., & Oliver, T. (2014). Training 
public health superheroes: five talents for public health leadership. Journal Of 
Public Health, 36(4), 552-561. 
DeSalvo, K., O’Carroll, P., Koo, D., Auerbach, J., and Monroe J. (2016) “Public Health 
3.0: Time for an Upgrade”, American Journal of Public Health, 106(4), 621-622. 
Food and Drug Administration. (2018). Supporting Antimicrobial Stewardship In 
Veterinary Settings. Retrieved from 
https://www.fda.gov/downloads/AnimalVeterinary/SafetyHealth/AntimicrobialResi
stance/UCM620420.pdf. 
International Association of Public Participation [IAP2]. (2014). IAP2’s Public 
Participation Spectrum. Retrieved from 
https://cdn.ymaws.com/www.iap2.org/resource/resmgr/foundations_course/IAP2
_P2_Spectrum_FINAL.pdf. 
Karp, B., Tate, H., Plumblee, J., Dessai, U., Whichard, J., & Thacker, E. et al. (2017). 
National Antimicrobial Resistance Monitoring System: Two Decades of 
Advancing Public Health Through Integrated Surveillance of Antimicrobial 
Resistance. Foodborne Pathogens And Disease, 14(10), 545-557. 
Kouzes, J., & Posner, B. (2012). The Leadership Challenge (5th ed.). San Francisco: 
John Wiley & Sons, Incorporated. 
McDermott, P., Tyson, G., Kabera, C., Chen, Y., Li, C., & Folster, J. et al. (2016). 
Whole-Genome Sequencing for Detecting Antimicrobial Resistance in 
 74 
Nontyphoidal Salmonella. Antimicrobial Agents And Chemotherapy, 60(9), 5515-
5520. doi: 10.1128/aac.01030-16 
Montgomery, M., Robertson, S., Koski, L., Salehi, E., Stevenson, L., & Silver, R. et al. 
(2018). Multidrug-Resistant Campylobacter jejuni Outbreak Linked to Puppy 
Exposure — United States, 2016–2018. MMWR. Morbidity And Mortality Weekly 
Report, 67(37), 1032-1035. 
RESOLVE. (2014). The High Achieving Governmental Health Department in 2020 as 
the Community Chief Health Strategist. Washington, DC: RESOLVE. Retrieved 
from http://www.resolv.org/site-healthleadershipforum/files/2014/05/The-High-
Achieving-Governmental-Health-Department-as-the-Chief-Health-Strategist-by-
2020-Final1.pdf  
Robertson, S., Burakoff, A., Stevenson, L., Tompkins, B., Patel, K., & Tolar, B. et al. 
(2018). Notes from the Field: Recurrence of a Multistate Outbreak of Salmonella 
Enteritidis Infections Linked to Contact with Guinea Pigs — Eight States, 2015–
2017. MMWR. Morbidity And Mortality Weekly Report, 67(42), 1195-1196. 
Sanchez, G., Fleming-Dutra, K., Roberts, R., & Hicks, L. (2016). Core Elements of 
Outpatient Antibiotic Stewardship. MMWR. Recommendations And 
Reports, 65(6), 1-12. doi: 10.15585/mmwr.rr6506a1 
Scallan, E., Hoekstra, R. M., Angulo, F. J., Tauxe, R. V., Widdowson, M. A., Roy, S. L., 
Jones, J. L., et al. (2011). Foodborne illness acquired in the United States--major 
pathogens. Emerging infectious diseases, 17(1), 7-15. 
Shane, A., Mody, R., Crump, J., Tarr, P., Steiner, T., & Kotloff, K. et al. (2017). 2017 
Infectious Diseases Society of America Clinical Practice Guidelines for the 
Diagnosis and Management of Infectious Diarrhea. Clinical Infectious 
Diseases, 65(12), e45-e80. 
Turtles intrastate and interstate requirements, 21 CFR 1240.62 (2018). 
World Health Organization. Ad-hoc Interagency Coordination Group. Retrieved from: 
www.who.int/antimicrobial-resistance/interagency-coordination-group/en/. 
World Health Organization. (2018). Antibiotic resistance. Retrieved from 
http://www.who.int/en/news-room/fact-sheets/detail/antibiotic-resistance.  
World Health Organization. (2018). Antimicrobial resistance. Retrieved from 
http://www.who.int/en/news-room/fact-sheets/detail/antimicrobial-resistance. 
Yukl, G. & Uppal, N. (2012). Leadership in Organizations. London: Pearson. 
